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Alex B. Long* 
Abstract: Until fairly recently, the narrative regarding employment retaliation plaintiffs has 
been that the federal courts—and the Supreme Court in particular—are generally sympathetic 
to employees claiming illegal workplace retaliation. This narrative has changed drastically 
over the past few years, to the point that there has been a backlash among courts to the initial 
wave of plaintiff success. In this respect, the evolution of retaliation law largely tracks the 
evolution of disability law. This Article argues that the evolution of these areas of the law 
illustrates a simple but fundamental point about the interpretation of statutes regulating the 
workplace at present: unless the text of the statute strongly supports a reading that limits the 
discretion traditionally afforded to employers under the employment at-will doctrine, courts, 
as a general rule, will not adopt that reading, nor will they apply the statute in that manner.  
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“[T]he court cited its own age-old quote: ‘[T]his Court does not 
sit as a “super-personnel department,” second guessing whether’ 
the employer’s decision was prudent. That’s poetry, right?” 
—Employment defense lawyer1 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the more enduring narratives regarding employment 
discrimination law is that the federal courts are hostile to discrimination 
claims.2 In example after example, the Supreme Court and lower courts 
have adopted and applied narrow readings of employment discrimination 
statutes that have made it more difficult for plaintiffs to survive summary 
judgment, let alone prevail at trial.3 Thus, it is now almost an article of 
                                                     
1. Lehr Middlebrooks & Vreeland, P.C., How Can I Demote Thee? Let Me Count the Complaints, 
ALA. EMP. L. LETTER, Mar. 2013 (second alteration in original). 
2. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in 
Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103, 104–05 (2009) (noting the 
perception that courts are biased against employment discrimination plaintiffs); Margaret H. Lemos, 
Special Incentives to Sue, 95 MINN. L. REV. 782, 830 (2011) (“[R]eports of judicial hostility to, and 
backlash against, employment discrimination statutes are legion in the academic literature.”). 
3. See Tristin K. Green, Racial Emotion in the Workplace, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 959, 983 (2013) 
(discussing, for example, how the “stray remarks” doctrine narrows the reach of discrimination law); 
L. Camille Hebert, Conceptualizing Sexual Harassment in the Workplace as a Dignitary Tort, 75 
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faith among employment law scholars that federal courts have little 
patience with employment discrimination suits. 
Until fairly recently, the narrative regarding retaliation plaintiffs stood 
in sharp contrast. Here, the narrative for some time was that the federal 
courts—and the Supreme Court in particular—are generally sympathetic 
to employees claiming illegal workplace retaliation.4 In contrast to the 
Supreme Court’s generally restrictive interpretations of the anti-
discrimination language in federal statutes, the narrative has traditionally 
been that the Court has taken a more pragmatic approach when 
interpreting the anti-retaliation language in federal statutes governing the 
workplace.5 
This narrative concerning retaliation law had at least some basis in 
reality for over fifteen years. But the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in 
University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar6 represented 
a dramatic departure from the general trend favoring retaliation plaintiffs. 
In Nassar, the Court held that Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision 
employs a demanding “but-for” standard of causation rather than the more 
liberal “motivating factor” standard employed by some lower courts.7 And 
while prior Supreme Court retaliation decisions were almost uniformly 
pro-plaintiff on the surface, the decisions have not had the sort of 
liberalizing effect on lower court retaliation decisions one might expect. 
Instead, lower courts seem to have responded to the Court’s pro-plaintiff 
decisions by taking a stricter approach to retaliation cases and making it 
more difficult for plaintiffs to survive summary judgment.8 
                                                     
OHIO ST. L.J. 1345, 1347 n.11 (2014) (noting how lower courts have interpreted Supreme Court 
decisions so as to reduce employer liability for supervisor harassment); Sandra F. Sperino, Rethinking 
Discrimination Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 69, 85 (2011) (discussing the courts’ narrow conception of 
the concept of intent in discrimination cases). 
4. See Frank C. Morris, Jr., Oral Discomfort: Supreme Court Holds that Verbal FLSA Complaints 
Suffice, LAB. & EMP. PRAC. ACT NOW ADVISORY (Epstein, Becker & Green P.C., Washington, D.C.), 
Mar. 25, 2011, at 2, http://www.ebglaw.com/content/uploads/2014/06/43644_Act-Now-Advisory-
Oral-Discomfort.pdf [https://perma.cc/477D-QPEG] (“[E]mployers should be on notice that the 
Supreme Court and, therefore, the lower courts are extremely receptive to retaliation claims and 
unlikely to dismiss them on technical grounds.”); Abigail Rubenstein, High Court Poised to Shape 
Landscape for Retaliation Suits, LAW360 (Apr. 22, 2013), https://www.law360.com/articles/434764/ 
high-court-poised-to-shape-landscape-for-retaliation-suits [https://perma.cc/8XLU-Z6Q4] (“[T]he 
high court has often shown itself sympathetic to plaintiffs claiming retaliation in recent years, 
attorneys say.”). 
5. See infra note 49 and accompanying text. 
6. __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013). 
7. Id. at 2532–33. 
8. See infra notes 67–123 and accompanying text. 
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Statutory anti-retaliation provisions exist in large measure to help 
ensure that those who have been discriminated against or who have 
information about such discrimination are not deterred from coming 
forward for fear of retaliation by their employers.9 The recent trend toward 
more restrictive interpretation and application of anti-retaliation 
provisions has led to some concern that the underlying purposes of these 
provisions are being hindered.10 
At least two questions emerge from this reassessment of retaliation law. 
The first is whether the increasingly restrictive approach of federal courts 
to retaliation claims is reflective of increased hostility to such claims. In 
other words, has the prevailing attitude of the federal judiciary become 
less sympathetic to the complaints of retaliation plaintiffs? The second 
question is, if there has been an attitudinal shift, why? Why are more 
federal courts more hostile to retaliation claims than in the recent past? 
In this Article, I posit that while the initial successes enjoyed by 
retaliation plaintiffs created something of a false sense of optimism, there 
has, in fact, been a general shift in the judiciary’s approach to retaliation 
claims. The shift that has taken place bears a striking resemblance to the 
judicial backlash that occurred following implementation of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act.11 The Article further posits that some of 
the same reasons that contributed to the disability backlash are 
contributing to the current retaliation backlash. 
To provide the background necessary to evaluate this argument, Part I 
of the Article discusses the elements of a standard employment retaliation 
claim. Part II examines the evolution of retaliation claims in the federal 
judiciary, from the initial boom time for retaliation plaintiffs to the leaner 
times in more recent years. This Part examines how the judicial backlash 
toward retaliation claims has made it more difficult for retaliation 
plaintiffs to prevail. Part III explores the similarities between the courts’ 
treatment of disability discrimination claims and retaliation claims and 
suggests that the same concerns that drove the initial American With 
                                                     
9. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006) (“The antiretaliation 
provision seeks to prevent employer interference with ‘unfettered access’ to Title VII’s remedial 
mechanisms.” (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997))); Craig Robert Senn, 
Redefining Protected “Opposition” Activity in Employment Discrimination Cases, 37 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 2035, 2079 (2016) (“The purpose and policy behind these provisions is simple: to encourage 
employee complaints or reports of inappropriate workplace conduct.”). 
10. See Senn, supra note 9, at 2080 (arguing that “[t]he current definition of protected opposition 
activity clearly frustrates antiretaliation law’s purpose and policy”); Sandra F. Sperino, Retaliation 
and the Reasonable Person, 67 FLA. L. REV. 2031, 2069 (2016) (“If the underlying purpose of 
retaliation law is to encourage people to complain about discrimination, then the current majority 
rules fail to accomplish this for a wide swath of potential retaliatory conduct.”). 
11. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. & 47 U.S.C.); infra Part III. 
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Disabilities Act (ADA) backlash—most notably, concerns over intruding 
upon employer discretion—are driving the retaliation backlash. Finally, 
Part IV argues that the evolution of these areas of the law illustrate a 
simple but fundamental point about the interpretation of statutes 
regulating the workplace at present: unless the text of the statute strongly 
supports a reading that limits the discretion traditionally afforded to 
employers under the employment at-will doctrine, courts, as a general 
rule, will not adopt that reading, nor will they apply the statute in that 
manner. In light of this reality, this Article suggests several possible 
legislative revisions to the anti-retaliation provisions contained in Title 
VII and other workplace laws. 
I. RETALIATION CLAIMS: THE PRIMA FACIE CASE AND 
BACKGROUND 
Courts have articulated the framework for retaliation claims in a variety 
of ways. But however the prima facie case is stated, a retaliation plaintiff 
will always need to prove the following elements: (1) that the employee 
engaged in protected conduct; (2) that the employer’s retaliatory action 
was materially adverse; and (3) that there is a causal connection between 
the protected conduct and the retaliatory action.12 
A. Protected Conduct 
To establish a prima facie case, an employee must first show that the 
employee engaged in protected conduct.13 Title VII’s anti-retaliation 
provision lists two types of protected activity: opposition conduct and 
participation conduct.14 
1. Opposition Conduct 
First, an employer is prohibited from retaliating against an employee 
because the employee “has opposed any practice made an unlawful 
employment practice by [Title VII].”15 This portion of the anti-retaliation 
provision, known as the opposition clause, most obviously applies when 
an employee somehow communicates to the employer the employee’s 
belief that the employer has engaged in unlawful discrimination and 
                                                     
12. Davis v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 383 F.3d 309, 319 (5th Cir. 2004); Sperino, supra note 10, 
at 2037.  
13. Davis, 383 F.3d at 319. 
14. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2012). 
15. Id. 
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objects to the employer’s conduct.16 But the opposition clause may apply 
in other instances as well. 
In Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville,17 the Supreme 
Court further elaborated upon the meaning of the opposition clause. 
Crawford involved an employee who had allegedly been retaliated against 
after participating in an employer’s internal investigation into allegations 
of sexual harassment. When, during the internal investigation, the 
employee was asked whether she had ever observed any inappropriate 
conduct on the part of the organization’s human resource director, the 
employee described several instances of such conduct.18 The Court 
concluded that the employee had engaged in protected opposition conduct 
when she provided “an ostensibly disapproving account of sexually 
obnoxious behavior toward her by a fellow employee.”19 In doing so, the 
Court rejected the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals’ view that the opposition 
clause “demands active, consistent ‘opposing activities’” before conduct 
is protected.20 Nor, under the Court’s holding, must the employee actually 
instigate or initiate a complaint to be protected.21 Instead, less 
demonstrable forms of opposition may be protected, provided they are 
still “resistant” or “antagonistic” to an employer’s actions.22 
Importantly, courts have also not interpreted the language of the 
opposition clause literally. The opposition clause protects an employee 
who opposes “any practice made an unlawful employment practice.” Read 
literally, an employee would only be protected where the employer’s 
practice was actually illegal. However, recognizing the impracticability of 
such a standard, courts have consistently only required that an employee 
have a reasonable belief that that the employer’s actions are unlawful.23 
2. Participation Conduct 
Title VII also prohibits an employer from retaliating against an 
employee “because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or 
                                                     
16. Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 555 U.S. 271, 276 (2009). 
17. 555 U.S. 271 (2009). 
18. Id. at 274. 
19. Id. at 276. 
20. Id. at 275 (quoting Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 211 F. App’x 373, 376 (6th Cir. 
2006)). 
21. Id. at 277. 
22. Id. at 276 (brackets omitted). 
23. See Clark Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 271 (2001) (per curiam) (referencing lower 
court’s standard and assuming it applied). This “reasonable belief” standard is discussed in greater 
detail infra section II.B.  
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participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing 
under [Title VII].”24 This clause of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision, 
known as the participation clause, most obviously applies when the victim 
of discrimination files a formal charge of discrimination with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).25 But the clause also 
applies when an employee participates as a witness in a formal proceeding 
under Title VII.26 
Title VII’s participation clause is broader than its opposition clause in 
at least two respects. First, it contains the “in any manner” language, 
which courts have characterized as being “exceptionally broad” in 
scope.27 Given the broad protection afforded by the clause, courts have 
held, for example, that the provision protects such action as helping a 
coworker file a discrimination complaint.28 In addition, unlike the 
opposition clause, courts have typically not imposed any type of 
reasonableness requirement. Thus, the participation clause protects those 
who were not only wrong or unreasonable in their belief that an employer 
engaged in illegal conduct, but also those who made charges that were 
defamatory or malicious.29 
B. Material Adversity 
A retaliation plaintiff must also prove that the employer’s retaliatory 
action was materially adverse. Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision 
prohibits an employer from “discriminat[ing] against” an employee who 
has engaged in protected activity.30 The Supreme Court has explained that 
this means that a retaliation plaintiff must establish that the employer’s 
actions “would have been materially adverse to a reasonable employee or 
job applicant.”31 
When the Court settled on this standard in Burlington Northern & 
Santa Fe Railway v. White32 in 2006, it had several competing standards 
from which to choose. One option would have been to extend a remedy 
                                                     
24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2012). 
25. Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304, 1313 (6th Cir. 1989). 
26. See Merritt v. Dillard Paper Co., 120 F.3d 1181, 1186 (11th Cir. 1997) (concluding clause 
applied when witness testified in a deposition). 
27. See, e.g., Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1006 n.18 (5th Cir. 1969).  
28. E.g., Eichman v. Ind. State Univ. Bd. of Trs., 597 F.2d 1104, 1107 (7th Cir. 1979). 
29. Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 582 (6th Cir. 2000). 
30. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a) (2012). 
31. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006). 
32. 548 U.S. 53 (2006). 
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only to an employee who suffered an adverse employment action, meaning 
a material change in the terms and conditions of employment.33 Another, 
more restrictive approach would have limited retaliation claims to 
situations in which the employee suffered an ultimate employment action, 
“such as hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting, and 
compensating.”34 
Instead, relying on both the statutory language and the purposes 
underlying anti-retaliation provisions, the Court settled on the more 
expansive “materially adverse” standard.35 Under this approach, an 
employer’s retaliatory action is actionable when it “could well dissuade a 
reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of 
discrimination.”36 The Court observed that, unlike Title VII’s anti-
discrimination provision, Title VII’s anti-retaliation language was not 
limited in scope to employer actions that impacted the terms and 
conditions of employment.37 Indeed, the Court noted that there might be 
some forms of employer retaliation having no impact on the terms and 
conditions of employment that would be just as effective in deterring 
employees from reporting unlawful discrimination or engaging in other 
forms of protected activity.38 As the primary purpose of anti-retaliation 
provisions is to preserve employees’ “unfettered access to statutory 
remedial mechanisms,” it made sense to define actionable retaliation in 
terms of employer conduct that interferes with such access.39 
Thus, the Court held that employer retaliation is actionable where it 
would have been materially adverse to a reasonable employee.40 
Importantly, the Court elaborated on this idea by noting that materiality 
must be judged by the particular circumstances of the employee in 
question. As an example, the Court noted, “[a] schedule change in an 
employee’s work schedule may make little difference to many workers, 
but may matter enormously to a young mother with school-age 
children.”41 The Court recognized that, given the differences in 
workplaces, it made little sense to establish a laundry list of prohibited 
forms of employer conduct: “[t]he real social impact of workplace 
                                                     
33. Id. at 60. 
34. Id. (quoting Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997)).  
35. Id. at 57. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. at 62.  
38. Id. at 64. 
39. Id. (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997)). 
40. Id. at 57. 
41. Id. at 69. 
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behavior often depends on a constellation of surrounding circumstances, 
expectations, and relationships which are not fully captured by a simple 
recitation of the words used or the physical acts performed.”42 In other 
words, “[c]ontext matters.”43 Thus, not only did the Court reject a 
retaliation standard tied to employer actions impacting the workplace, it 
adopted a standard that requires courts to consider what might be material 
to the employee in question. 
C. Causal Connection 
Finally, a retaliation plaintiff must also establish a causal connection 
between the protected activity and the employer’s action.44 Specifically, a 
retaliation plaintiff must establish that the protected activity was a “but-
for” cause of the employer’s adverse action.45 Where the adverse action 
follows the protected activity closely enough in time, courts sometimes 
permit temporal proximity to serve as a proof of the causal connection.46 
But where close temporal proximity is lacking, a plaintiff may be required 
to introduce other evidence to satisfy the causal connection requirement.47 
II. THE RISE AND FALL OF RETALIATION LAW 
By and large, plaintiffs who have brought statutory employment 
retaliation claims have fared quite well before the Supreme Court.48 As a 
result, the common perception has been that, contrary to the Court’s 
discrimination decisions, the Court’s retaliation decisions have had “a 
pro-employee tilt.”49 The Court’s 2013 decision in University of Texas 
                                                     
42. Id. 
43. Id. 
44. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2525 (2013). 
45. Id.  
46. See Clark Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001) (per curiam) (noting this 
approach by some courts). 
47. See id. at 273 (“The cases that accept mere temporal proximity between an employer’s 
knowledge of protected activity and an adverse employment action as sufficient evidence of causality 
to establish a prima facie case uniformly hold that the temporal proximity must be ‘very close.’” 
(quoting O’Neal v. Ferguson Constr. Co., 237 F.3d 1248, 1253 (10th Cir. 2001))). 
48. See Alex B. Long, Employment Retaliation and the Accident of Text, 90 OR. L. REV. 925, 926 
(2011) (discussing plaintiffs’ successes). 
49. Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation in the EEO Office, 50 TULSA L. REV. 1, 37 (2014); see also 
Michael J. Zimmer, A Pro-Employee Supreme Court?: The Retaliation Decisions, 60 S.C. L. REV. 
917, 918 (2009) (stating that the Court has been “pro-employee” in its retaliation decisions); Kimberly 
A. Pathman, Note, Protecting Title VII’s Antiretaliation Provision in the Wake of University of Texas 
Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 109 Nw. U. L. REV. 475, 491–92 (2015) (referring to the 
Court’s pro-employee reputation in retaliation cases). 
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Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, which holds retaliation plaintiffs 
to a demanding causation standard,50 effectively shattered this perception. 
What’s more, as this Part discusses, lower courts have increasingly held 
retaliation plaintiffs to demanding standards with respect to other aspects 
of a plaintiff’s prima facie case.51 Thus, some of the initial optimism that 
arose from the Supreme Court’s early retaliation decisions has 
increasingly given way to a sense that courts are undermining the 
purposes of statutory anti-retaliation provisions. This Part examines the 
federal courts’ evolving approach to employment retaliation claims. 
A. Retaliation Boom 
The Supreme Court’s first meaningful foray into interpreting the anti-
retaliation provisions contained in Title VII and related statutes was in 
1997 in Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.52 There, the Court held that the term 
“employees” in Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision referred not just to 
current employees but to former employees as well.53 That conclusion, 
while reasonable, seemed far from obvious.54 Nonetheless, in a 
unanimous opinion authored by Justice Thomas, the Court relied heavily 
on the text of the statute—with a brief nod to the underlying purpose of 
anti-retaliation provisions55—to provide an expansive reading of the 
statute.56 
Robinson set the stage for a run of victories by employment retaliation 
plaintiffs asserting statutory claims before the Court over the next two 
                                                     
50. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2525. 
51. See Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, The Failure of Title VII as a Rights-Claiming 
System, 86 N.C. L. REV. 859, 908 (2008) (discussing lower courts’ strict approach when deciding 
whether an employer’s retaliation is actionable); Lawrence D. Rosenthal, A Lack of “Motivation,” or 
Sound Legal Reasoning? Why Most Courts Are Not Applying Either Price Waterhouse’s or the 1991 
Civil Rights Act’s Motivating-Factor Analysis to Title VII Retaliation Claims in a Post-Gross World 
(but Should), 64 ALA. L. REV. 1067, 1068 (2013) (discussing lower courts’ handling of causation 
issues); Sperino, supra note 10, at 2035–36 (discussing lower court opinions involving the issue of 
the reasonableness of an employee’s belief that employer conduct was unlawful). 
52. 519 U.S. 337 (1997). The seminal employment discrimination case, McDonnell Douglas Corp. 
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), originally involved claims of discrimination and retaliation, but the 
retaliation claim had dropped from the case by the time it reached the Supreme Court. Id. at 797. 
53. Robinson, 519 U.S. at 346. 
54. There was a circuit split at the time. Id. at 340. 
55. See id. at 346 (explaining that the plaintiff’s textual arguments were persuasive in light of the 
purpose of anti-retaliation provisions to maintain unfettered access to statutory remedial 
mechanisms). 
56. Id. at 340–46. 
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decades.57 In 2005, for example, the Court held that Title IX prohibited 
employment retaliation, despite the fact that the statute contained no 
express prohibition on retaliation.58 In 2006, the Court decided Burlington 
Northern & Santa Fe Railway v. White, which, as discussed, chose an 
expansive standard for actionable retaliation from among a range of more 
restrictive options. Other similar decisions followed, with the high-water 
mark perhaps being the Court’s 2011 decision in Thompson v. North 
American Stainless, LP.59 In Thompson, the Supreme Court held that Title 
VII affords a remedy not just to those who engage in protected activity, 
but also to those who are retaliated against because another employee has 
engaged in such activity.60 
On the surface, these decisions seemed to create a pro-employee 
environment in the courts for retaliation plaintiffs. Commentators took 
notice and frequently characterized the Supreme Court as being 
sympathetic to the plight of the victims of workplace retaliation or at least 
of having taken a less formalistic, more pragmatic approach to the 
interpretation of statutory anti-retaliation provisions than it had anti-
discrimination provisions.61 Defense lawyers also took note. Speaking in 
                                                     
57. See, e.g., Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 563 U.S. 1 (2011) (holding that 
making an oral complaint of unlawful conduct is protected conduct under the Fair Labor Standards 
Act’s anti-retaliation provision); Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170 (2011) (holding 
that firing an employee due to the protected activity of employee’s fiancée amounts to unlawful 
retaliation); Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 555 U.S. 271 (2009) (holding that employee 
engaged in protected activity when she participated in employer’s internal investigation of sexual 
harassment allegations); CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442 (2008) (holding that 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1981 provides for a retaliation cause of action for an individual who suffers for retaliation for 
attempting to assist another); Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474 (2008) (holding that the anti-
retaliation provision of the federal sector provision of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
provides a remedy for retaliation victims); Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) 
(holding that a retaliation plaintiff need not show an adverse employment action in order to make out 
a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII); Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167 
(2005) (holding that Title IX prohibits recipients of federal education funding from retaliating against 
an individual who complains about unlawful sex discrimination, despite the absence of any express 
statutory prohibition on retaliation). The two notable exceptions to this trend are University of Texas 
Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2525 (2013), which held that a 
Title VII retaliation plaintiff must satisfy the demanding “but for” causation standard, and Clark 
County School District v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 271 (2001) (per curiam), which held that the 
plaintiff’s internal complaints of discrimination were not protected because no reasonable person 
could believe that employer’s actions were unlawful. 
58. Jackson, 544 U.S. at 179. 
59. 562 U.S. 170 (2011). 
60. Id. at 178. 
61. Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation in an EEO World, 89 IND. L.J. 115, 126 (2014) (summarizing 
the scholarship in the field as concluding that the Court had taken a more pragmatic approach in the 
case of retaliation cases than in discrimination cases); David L. Hudson, Jr., Back at Ya: Employee 
Retaliation Claims Pay Big Before the High Court, ABA J., June 1, 2011, at 21 (“The high court 
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2012, one employment defense lawyer opined that “unquestionably, 
retaliation is the greatest challenge for employers today.”62 
One likely result of all of these pro-plaintiff retaliation decisions was a 
dramatic increase in the number of retaliation claims. In 2009—coming 
shortly on the heels of a string of victories for retaliation plaintiffs before 
the Supreme Court—retaliation claims became the most common 
individual charge filed with the EEOC.63 Between 1997 and 2012, the 
number of individual charges of retaliation in violation of federal law filed 
with the EEOC more than doubled.64 This stands in sharp contrast with 
the number of statutory discrimination claims involving various forms of 
discrimination (most notably race, sex, and age), which have stayed 
relatively constant or increased only slightly during this same time 
period.65 Thus, it is fair to say that prior to 2013, the narrative regarding 
employment retaliation cases was one of employee success.66 
B. Retaliation Backlash 
While retaliation plaintiffs were generally enjoying success in front of 
the Supreme Court, there was cause for concern among plaintiffs’ lawyers 
who were paying attention. Lower courts were often taking a more 
restrictive approach to retaliation claims.67 To be sure, some restrictive 
rules had already started to develop prior to the spate of Supreme Court 
                                                     
continues to be a favorable forum for employees who allege retaliation from their employers.”); 
Richard Moberly, The Supreme Court’s Antiretaliation Principle, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 375, 381–
82 (2010) (observing that the Court’s approach in retaliation cases “typically has led to enhanced 
employee protection as compared to other types of employment-law cases”). 
62. Scott Flander, The Trouble with Retaliation, HUM. RESOURCE EXECUTIVE, June 16, 2012, at 
19. 
63. David Long-Daniels & Peter N. Hall, Risky Business: Litigating Retaliation Claims, 28 ABA 
J. LAB. & EMP. L. 437, 437 (2013). 
64. Charge Statistics (Charges Filed with EEOC) FY 1997 Through FY 2017, U.S. EQUAL EMP. 
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm [https:// 
perma.cc/EUZ3-94TR]. 
65. For example, in 1997, 29,199 charges of race discrimination were filed with the EEOC. In 2015, 
that number was 31,027. Id. Two notable exceptions to this trend of relative stability in the number 
of discrimination charges are religion claims, which have more than doubled, and color claims, which 
have more than tripled. Id.  
66. See Long-Daniels & Hall, supra note 63, at 448 (stating that given then-recent Supreme Court 
decisions, “the law has shifted to favor plaintiffs who assert retaliation claims” and has made it easier 
for plaintiffs to survive summary judgment). 
67. See Brake & Grossman, supra note 51, at 908–09 (discussing early lower court decisions 
following Burlington Northern in which courts took a strict approach to the question of material 
adversity). 
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retaliation decisions.68 But as the Court began to interpret statutory anti-
retaliation provisions in a way that tended to benefit employees, the lower 
courts were sometimes narrowing the scope of the provisions. And in 
2013, the win streak that retaliation plaintiffs had enjoyed in front of the 
Court came to a dramatic halt. This section examines the reversal of 
fortune for retaliation plaintiffs. 
1. Protected Conduct 
One of the most significant limitations lower courts have placed on 
retaliation claims is the demanding standard they often impose regarding 
whether an employee who opposed employer conduct had a reasonable 
belief that the conduct was unlawful. As discussed, in order for an 
employee’s conduct to be protected under the opposition clause, the 
employee must have a reasonable belief that the conduct being opposed is 
actually unlawful.69 In Clark County School District v. Breeden,70 the 
Supreme Court assumed, without deciding, that this was the proper 
interpretation of Title VII’s opposition clause.71 Numerous lower courts 
had already adopted this same interpretation by the time Breeden was 
decided,72 but Breeden undoubtedly led to the uniform adoption of the 
reasonableness requirement when assessing whether opposition conduct 
is protected.73 
                                                     
68. For example, lower courts were already well on their way toward establishing the bright-line 
rule that an employee who files an internal complaint of discrimination is protected from retaliation, 
if at all, by the narrower opposition clause rather than the more expansive participation clause by the 
time the Supreme Court started considering retaliation cases more frequently. See Vasconcelos v. 
Meese, 907 F.2d 111, 113 (9th Cir. 1990); Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 
1304, 1313 (6th Cir. 1989); Laughlin v. Metro. Wash. Airport Auth., 952 F. Supp. 1129, 1134 (E.D. 
Va. 1997); Shinwari v. Raytheon Aircraft Co., 25 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1210 (D. Kan. 1998); Morris v. 
Bos. Edison Co., 942 F. Supp. 65, 70 (D. Mass. 1996). 
69. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
70. 532 U.S. 268 (2001) (per curiam). 
71. Id. at 271. 
72. See, e.g., Moyo v. Gomez, 40 F.3d 982, 985 (9th Cir. 1994); Payne v. McLemore’s Wholesale 
& Retail Stores, 654 F.2d 1130, 1140 (5th Cir. 1981). 
73. See Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REV. 18, 83 (2005) (“Since Breeden, courts 
have required plaintiffs bringing retaliation claims under the opposition clause to demonstrate a good 
faith, reasonable belief that the underlying conduct amounted to unlawful discrimination.”); Moberly, 
supra note 61, at 447 (stating Breeden “paved the way for courts uniformly to adopt the reasonable-
belief standard for a broad range of statutes”). Professor Lawrence D. Rosenthal has noted that there 
were at least some courts that, prior to Breeden, merely required that a plaintiff have a subjective, 
good faith belief that the conduct was unlawful, not that the belief also be objectively reasonable. 
Lawrence D. Rosenthal, To Report or Not to Report: The Case for Eliminating the Objectively 
Reasonable Requirement for Opposition Activity Under Title VII’s Anti-Retaliation Provision, 39 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1127, 1135–36 (2007). 
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While Breeden accelerated the trend toward adoption of the 
“reasonable belief” rule, the decision also laid the groundwork for the 
adoption of a restrictive interpretation of this concept by lower courts. 
Breeden involved an employee who complained about a single incident of 
sexual harassment. Specifically, the plaintiff, her supervisor, and others 
were assigned the task of reviewing job applications. The supervisor read 
aloud a crude comment contained in one of the applications, which 
prompted the supervisor and another male employee to chuckle.74 Relying 
upon its past sexual harassment decisions, the Court noted that this 
conduct did not qualify as the type of severe or pervasive behavior 
necessary to support a sexual harassment claim.75 Indeed, the Court 
concluded, no reasonable employee could believe that the conduct 
actually violated Title VII; thus, the plaintiff’s opposition to her 
supervisor’s behavior was unprotected from retaliation.76 
Standing alone, Breeden represents something of a mixed bag for 
retaliation plaintiffs. In contexts outside of the employment 
discrimination realm, courts have sometimes required that the conduct 
complained of must actually be illegal before a plaintiff is entitled to 
protection.77 In this respect, Breeden’s “reasonable belief” standard is 
decidedly more pro-plaintiff than it might have been. At the same time, 
given employees’ relative lack of knowledge of employment 
discrimination law, Breeden perhaps presents a closer case on the issue of 
whether a reasonable employee could believe that the conduct in question 
was unlawful than the Court’s per curiam opinion lets on.78 But following 
Breeden, not only have lower courts required that retaliation plaintiffs 
reasonably believe that the conduct they are opposing is unlawful, they 
have often imposed a demanding standard of reasonableness.79 
In determining whether a retaliation plaintiff’s belief that an 
employer’s conduct was unlawful under federal employment law when 
the plaintiff opposed the employer’s conduct, courts often hold these non-
                                                     
74. Breeden, 532 U.S. at 269. 
75. Id. at 271. 
76. Id. 
77. Rosenthal, supra note 73, at 1135 n.37. 
78. See Brake, supra note 73, at 82 (criticizing Breeden).  
79. See Brake, supra note 61, at 138 (“Not surprisingly, since Breeden itself involved a sexual 
harassment complaint, the reasonable belief requirement has spawned a now-sizeable body of cases 
in which internal complaints about harassment are unprotected because the underlying conduct was 
not severe or pervasive enough to be actionable.”); Moberly, supra note 61, at 447–48 (“Despite this 
seemingly employee-friendly standard, however, lower courts often have applied the reasonable-
belief requirement to narrow, rather than broaden, retaliation protection.”).  
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lawyer plaintiffs to a demanding standard.80 Courts have held that it was 
unreasonable for individuals to believe that an unlawful hostile work 
environment could be created when a co-worker referred to another 
individual as a “stupid mother fucking nigger” and a “stupid ass nigger” 
in the employee’s presence during a lunch break;81 when, in the company 
break room, a co-worker referred to two black individuals as “black 
monkeys” and suggested they be put “in a cage with a bunch of black apes 
and let the apes f—k them”;82 and when the EEOC issued a for-cause 
determination on the employee’s sexual harassment complaint after her 
manager made comments about the size of the employee’s breasts in the 
presence of others.83 
Importantly, existing precedent often works against a retaliation 
plaintiff in at least two ways. First, once a decision concluding that an 
employee’s belief that she was opposing unlawful conduct was not 
reasonable under a given set of facts, retaliation plaintiffs are often forced 
to try to distinguish their facts from those of the adverse precedent. For 
example, Butler v. Alabama Department of Transportation84 is the 
decision involving the co-worker who referred to another individual as a 
“stupid mother fucking nigger” and a “stupid ass nigger” in the plaintiff’s 
presence during a lunch break.85 The plaintiff claimed she was 
subsequently retaliated against after reporting the statements to her 
immediate supervisor.86 According to the Eleventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals, the plaintiff’s belief that she had reported unlawful conduct to 
her supervisor was “not even close” to objectively reasonable.87 Thus, 
Butler sends a clear message to would-be plaintiffs (and their lawyers) 
that their retaliation claims will be dead on arrival unless the conduct in 
question is significantly more egregious than that in Butler. 
                                                     
80. See Brake, supra note 73, at 89 (criticizing the approach of courts and noting “that most people 
lack the legal expertise to ascertain” what qualifies as sexual harassment); Matthew W. Green, Jr., 
What’s So Reasonable About Reasonableness? Rejecting a Case-Law Centered Approach to Title 
VII’s Reasonable Belief Doctrine, 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 759, 794 (2014) (noting the strict standard to 
which plaintiffs are held despite the fact “that most persons . . . are unfamiliar with Title VII case 
law”); Alex B. Long, The Troublemaker’s Friend: Retaliation Against Third Parties and the Right of 
Association in the Workplace, 59 FLA. L. REV. 931, 955 (2007) (stating “courts appear to hold an 
employee to the standard of what a reasonable labor and employment attorney would believe, rather 
than what a reasonable employee would believe”). 
81. Butler v. Ala. Dep’t of Transp., 536 F.3d 1209, 1210 (11th Cir. 2008). 
82. Jordan v. Alt. Res. Corp., 458 F.3d 332, 336 (4th Cir. 2006). 
83. Henderson v. Waffle House, Inc., 238 F. App’x 499, 503 (11th Cir. 2007). 
84. 536 F.3d 1209 (11th Cir. 2008). 
85. Id. at 1210. 
86. Id. at 1211. 
87. Id. at 1213. 
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The difficulty retaliation plaintiffs often face in attempting to 
distinguish prior precedent also illustrates the second obstacle prior 
precedent imposes upon plaintiffs. In reaching their decisions as to the 
reasonableness of an employee’s belief as to the unlawfulness of the 
conduct, courts often rely heavily on precedent actually defining unlawful 
conduct. The retaliation plaintiff who complains about a co-worker openly 
using two racist slurs on one occasion must grapple with the decisional 
law explaining when a discrimination claim involving a hostile work 
environment exists under Title VII. Thus, the plaintiff will be forced to 
explain how she could reasonably have believed the conduct was unlawful 
when decisional law is clear that, generally, a single offensive utterance 
does not create a hostile work environment and that “a racially derogatory 
remark by a co-worker, without more, does not constitute an unlawful 
employment practice.”88 
Of course, by directly linking the reasonableness of an employee’s 
belief to existing discrimination precedent, courts essentially require 
employees to be versed in the nuances of Title VII’s hostile-environment 
law and other discrimination theories. Indeed, at least one court has been 
explicit about this reality, explaining several times in an opinion (that was 
subsequently reversed) that an employee who was “versed in the relevant 
law” could not have reasonably believed that the conduct complained of 
was unlawful.89 This approach is particularly problematic in light of the 
fact that previous studies have shown that employees are not, in fact, 
versed in employment law and frequently overestimate the protection 
afforded to them by law.90 
                                                     
88. Little v. United Techs., 103 F.3d 956, 961 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Boyer-Liberto v. 
Fontainbleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 284 (4th Cir. 2015); O’Leary v. Accretive Health, Inc., 657 F.3d 
625, 631 (7th Cir. 2011); Jordan v. Alt. Res. Corp., 458 F.3d 332, 336 (4th Cir. 2006); King v. Piggly 
Wiggly Ala. Distrib. Co., Inc., 929 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1231 (N.D. Ala. 2013) (concluding, in light of 
Butler, that retaliation plaintiff lacked an objectively reasonable belief that being called “boy” by 
another employee at work was unlawful). But see La Grande v. DeCrescente Distrib. Co., Inc., 370 
F. App’x 206, 212 (2d Cir. 2010) (concluding factual issue existed regarding whether plaintiff could 
reasonably believe that a hostile work environment existed on the basis of two isolated instances). 
89. Howell v. Corizon, Inc., No. 12–0272–WS–N, 2013 WL 6068346, at *8 (S.D. Ala. Nov. 18, 
2013), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Howell v. Corr. Med. Servs., 612 F. App’x 590 (11th Cir. 
2015) (per curiam). In reversing the decision, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that 
“[a]lthough it is a close call,” the defendant’s conduct was “sufficient to render objectively reasonable 
Plaintiff’s good faith belief that she was opposing an unlawful employment practice.” Howell, 612 F. 
App’x at 591.  
90. See Rachel Arnow-Richman, Mainstreaming Employment Contract Law: The Common Law 
Case for Reasonable Notice of Termination, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1513, 1558, 1558 n.236 (2014) (citing 
numerous articles purporting to establish that employees mistakenly believe they enjoy something 
close to “just cause” protection from firing). 
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While many labor and employment lawyers could explain why these 
forms of behavior were not actually unlawful, it is counter-productive to 
the goals of anti-discrimination law to hold that an employee, confronted 
with these situations, was unreasonable in believing that the conduct was 
unlawful and thus unprotected from employer retaliation.91 Compounding 
the problem is the fact that employer policies and existing law strongly 
encourage employees to report suspected unlawful conduct. Supreme 
Court precedent gives employers an affirmative defense to a charge of 
unlawful harassment where they adopt effective anti-discrimination 
policies and internal reporting mechanisms for employees who believe 
they have observed unlawful discriminatory conduct.92 The end result is a 
situation in which the average employee, unaware of the subtleties of 
federal employment law, may run the risk of being fired or otherwise 
retaliated against with impunity when the employee mistakenly concludes 
that a single instance of sexual harassment or the single use of a racial 
epithet is unlawful and decides to complain. 
2. Material Adversity 
Lower courts have also increasingly taken a strict view regarding the 
material adversity standard developed in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe 
Railway v. White. According to Burlington Northern, an employer’s 
retaliatory action is “materially adverse” where it might dissuade a 
                                                     
91. See Green, supra note 80, at 787 (explaining that holding employees to a demanding standard 
“has the potential to deter complaints, undermining the informal resolution of claims and avoidance 
of harm principles that gave rise to the reasonable belief standard”). 
92. In Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998), and Burlington Industries, Inc. 
v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998), the Supreme Court recognized an affirmative defense whereby 
employers could avoid strict liability for a supervisor’s harassment of an employee if no tangible 
employment act was taken against an employee if the employer can establish: “(a) that the employer 
exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) 
that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective 
opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.” Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. The 
first prong of the affirmative defense is typically thought of as requiring an effective anti-harassment 
policy. Matvia v. Bald Head Island Mgmt., 259 F.3d 261, 268 (4th Cir. 2001). Sometimes these 
policies encourage employees to report sexual harassment and other forms of discrimination that is 
not, in fact, unlawful under federal law. See Brake, supra note 61, at 118. Moreover, an employee 
who fails to report possible discrimination or who delays in doing so may be precluded from bringing 
a discrimination claim against the employer. This is true even where the employee delays reporting 
in an attempt to gather evidence so that her employer is more likely to believe her or so that the 
employee can better understand the nature of the offending conduct. See Matvia, 259 F.3d at 269 
(applying this principle in the case of an employee who waited before reporting). Thus, employees 
face strong incentives to report objectionable conduct, even though it might not amount to unlawful 
conduct. Given the state of retaliation law, employees may face a classic catch-22: report possible 
discrimination and risk retaliation, only to be told that they have no retaliation claim, or not report 
and be told that they have no discrimination claim. 
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reasonable employee from engaging in protected activity.93 Yet, as 
Professor Sandra Sperino has explained, “lower courts routinely dismiss 
cases by ruling that certain consequences, such as threatened termination 
or negative evaluations, would not dissuade a reasonable person from 
filing a discrimination complaint.”94 
There are at least two noteworthy aspects to these lower court 
decisions. The first is that courts often seem to disregard the Supreme 
Court’s instruction that materiality must be judged from the perspective 
of the individual plaintiff in question and within the context of the specific 
workplace in question. In Burlington Northern, the Court specifically 
cautioned against the “simple recitation of the words used or the physical 
acts performed” in deciding whether an employer’s adverse action 
qualifies as materially adverse.95 Thus, while recognizing that certain 
seemingly minor retaliatory actions will ordinarily not be actionable, the 
result might change depending on the specific circumstances of the 
individuals involved, the nature of the workplace, or other relevant 
considerations.96 As an example, the Court cited the possibility that a 
schedule change “might be inconsequential to many workers but could 
dissuade a working mother from submitting a complaint.”97 
Yet lower courts have sometimes ignored the Supreme Court’s 
admonition that “context matters” and established bright-line rules 
regarding what qualifies as a materially adverse action.98 According to 
Professor Sperino, “[i]n case after case, appellate courts determine that a 
certain action does not constitute an adverse action without mentioning 
any of the individual circumstances of the plaintiff or his workplace.”99 
Thus, some lower courts, while ostensibly applying Burlington 
Northern’s materiality standard are, in fact, establishing adverse 
precedent for retaliation plaintiffs by ignoring a crucial facet of the 
opinion. 
The second noteworthy aspect of the decisions is that they sometimes 
take an unrealistic view of what is likely to dissuade an employee from 
complaining about unlawful discrimination. As Professor Sperino has 
detailed, in recent years courts have held that a host of seemingly serious 
forms of employer retaliation are not actionable. These include 
                                                     
93. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006). 
94. Sperino, supra note 10, at 2033. 
95. Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 69 (internal citations omitted). 
96. Id. 
97. Sperino, supra note 10, at 2040 (citing Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 69). 
98. See id. at 2058 (discussing the approach of lower courts). 
99. Id. at 2060. 
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threatening to fire the employee, providing negative evaluations or 
disciplinary notices, threatening the employee with suspension or 
discipline, and falsely reporting poor performance.100 Lower courts 
increasingly expect employees to have little concern over the possibility 
that they might, for example, receive a poor performance evaluation in 
retaliation when deciding whether to complain about unlawful 
discrimination.101 In reaching these kinds of conclusions, courts often 
characterize the employer actions in question as the sorts of “petty slights, 
minor annoyances, and simple lack of good manners” the Court identified 
in Burlington Northern as not being actionable.102 Thus, one sees 
decisions like one from a district court in Louisiana that concluded that 
allegedly giving an employee a poor evaluation and subjecting the 
employee to a seemingly constant barrage of retaliatory actions are the 
sorts of “normal irritations and tribulations of the work place” that 
employees should expect to endure when complaining about their 
employers’ possibly illegal conduct.103 
3. Causation 
Finally, lower courts have also used Supreme Court retaliation 
decisions to tighten the causal connection requirement in retaliation cases. 
a. Mere Temporal Proximity 
In Breeden, the Court held that the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate a 
sufficient causal connection between her protected act of filing a 
discrimination charge with the EEOC and the employer’s adverse action, 
which occurred twenty months later.104 The Court noted that some lower 
court decisions had accepted “mere temporal proximity between an 
employer’s knowledge of protected activity and an adverse employment 
action as sufficient evidence of causality to establish a prima facie 
                                                     
100. Id. at 2036. 
101. See Wilson-Robinson v. Our Lady of the Lake Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc., No. 10-584, 2012 WL 
5940912, at *5–7 (M.D. La. Nov. 27, 2012) (concluding that employer’s act of providing a rating of 
“poor” on employee’s evaluation was not materially adverse). 
102. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006). 
103. Wilson-Robinson, 2012 WL 5940912, at *7. Most of the alleged retaliatory acts—such as 
failing to send the plaintiff emails and meeting with the plaintiff on a weekly basis—seem fairly minor 
standing alone. When stacked on top of each other, however, they begin to look more material. In 
addition, others—such as changing the employee’s work schedule—are potentially more material 
even standing alone. Id. 
104. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273–74 (2001) (per curiam). 
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case.”105 However, the decisions that relied solely on temporal proximity 
“uniformly hold that the temporal proximity must be ‘very close.’”106 
Breeden’s use of the phrase “mere temporal proximity” has had a 
significant impact in influencing lower courts. Prior to Breeden, that 
phrase had been used in federal employment retaliation cases roughly 
sixty times.107 Following Breeden, the phrase has been used over 1,900 
times in federal decisions,108 typically in cases in which the plaintiff loses 
on the causation issue.109 And when lower courts observe that a plaintiff 
is relying upon “mere temporal proximity” in order to establish the causal 
link, they now also almost invariably add that such proximity must be 
“very close.”110 As applied by lower courts, the phrase “very close” 
means, in fact, very close.111 Under the specific facts of a case, a gap of 
one month between protected activity and adverse action has been held to 
be too long.112 The Eighth Circuit has held that a gap of two weeks was 
“sufficient, but barely so, to establish causation.”113 The Third Circuit 
Court of Appeals has held that anything over ten days requires 
supplemental evidence of causation.114 
                                                     
105. Id. at 273. 
106. Id. 
107. Using the search (retaliation & “mere temporal proximity” & DA(bef 4/23/2001))—to capture 
cases before the day Breeden was decided—in the Federal Cases database in Westlaw yielded sixty-
two decisions as of April 13, 2018. 
108. Using the search (retaliation & “mere temporal proximity” & DA(aft 4/23/2001)) in the 
Federal Cases database in Westlaw yielded 1,976 decisions on April 13, 2018. Not all of these are 
employment retaliation cases, but most are. 
109. See, e.g., Penley v. McDowell Cty. Bd. of Educ., 876 F.3d 646, 656–57 (4th Cir. 2017) 
(affirming summary judgment against employee); Townsend v. United States, 282 F. Supp. 3d 118, 
132 (D.D.C. 2017) (dismissing retaliation claim).  
110. Using the search (retaliation & “mere temporal proximity” /p “very close” & DA(aft 
4/23/2001)) in the Federal Cases database in Westlaw yielded 1,223 decisions on April 13, 2018. Not 
all of these are employment retaliation cases, but most are. 
111. In one recent decision, a federal district court surveyed the decisional law and noted that 
“[c]ourts have found seventeen days, fifteen days, and ten days to be sufficiently close to establish a 
causal connection.” Crain v. Schlumberger Tech. Co., 187 F. Supp. 3d 732, 741–42 (E.D. La. 2016) 
(footnotes omitted). Relying on this, the court found eleven days to be sufficiently close to establish 
a prima facie case. Id. 
112. Hardy v. Pepsi Bottling Co., No. 14-CV-4007 (VEC), 2016 WL 1301181, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 31, 2016); Wilson v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., No. 4:15CV00466 SWW, 2015 WL 9244650, 
at *4 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 15, 2015). But see Treglia v. Town of Manlius, 313 F.3d 713, 721 (2d Cir. 2002) 
(holding that prima facie retaliation case was established where approximately one month had elapsed 
between protected activity and adverse employment action). 
113. Smith v. Allen Health Sys., Inc., 302 F.3d 827, 833 (8th Cir. 2002). 
114. Blakney v. City of Philadelphia, 559 F. App’x 183, 186 (3d Cir. 2014). 
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b. Nassar and But-For Causation 
The other Supreme Court decision that is starting to have a similar 
limiting effect on the causation requirement is University of Texas 
Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, decided in 2013. The case 
presented the question of what causation standard Title VII employs. The 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals had held below that a Title VII retaliation 
plaintiff was only required to show that retaliation was a motivating factor 
in the employer’s action. Thus, as long as the employer was motivated, at 
least in part, to retaliate against the plaintiff for engaging in protected 
conduct, the causation requirement was satisfied.115 On appeal, the 
Supreme Court held that “Title VII retaliation claims must be proved 
according to traditional principles of but-for causation.”116 This requires 
proof on the plaintiff’s part “that the unlawful retaliation would not have 
occurred in the absence of the alleged wrongful action or actions of the 
employer.”117 
Nassar’s adoption of a but-for causation standard obviously subjects 
Title VII retaliation plaintiffs to a heightened causation standard, thus 
making it more difficult for retaliation plaintiffs to establish the requisite 
causal link between protected conduct and an employer’s adverse 
action.118 But the decision has had another effect on some lower court 
decisions. Nassar has also caused some lower courts to reevaluate the 
proposition that mere temporal proximity may ever establish causation. 
There were some courts, prior to Nassar, that took the position that mere 
temporal proximity could help establish the causation element of the 
                                                     
115. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2524 (2013) (citing Nassar 
v. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr., 674 F.3d 448, 454 (5th Cir. 2012)). 
116. Id. at 2533. 
117. Id. Nassar involved a Title VII retaliation claim. Not all statutes employ the same language 
as Title VII, thus leaving open the question as to what causation standard applies under some of these 
other statutes. See generally Nancy S. Modesitt, Causation in Whistleblowing Cases, 50 U. RICH. L. 
REV. 1193 (2016) (discussing the various causation standards that exist under different statutes). 
118. See Deborah L. Brake, Tortifying Retaliation: Protected Activity at the Intersection of Fault, 
Duty, and Causation, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1375, 1377 (2014) (referring to the but-for standard as stricter 
than the motivating factor standard); William R. Corbett, What Is Troubling About the Tortification 
of Employment Discrimination Law, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1027, 1029–30 (2014) (discussing the Court’s 
rejection of less rigorous causation standards in employment cases and its adoption of a but-for 
causation standard); Modesitt, supra note 117, at 1213 (discussing evidential problems plaintiffs face 
under a but-for causation standard); Kate Webber, It Is Political: Using the Models of Judicial 
Decision Making to Explain the Ideological History of Title VII, 89 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 841, 854 
(2015) (describing the motivating factor test as more lenient than the but-for test); Michael J. Zimmer, 
Hiding the Statute in Plain View: University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 14 
NEV. L.J. 705, 705 (2014) (“The obvious impact of Nassar is that it makes it more difficult for 
plaintiffs to prove retaliation.”). 
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plaintiff’s prima facie case but was insufficient, standing alone, to do 
so.119 Since Nassar, several courts have taken the position that Nassar 
forecloses the possibility that temporal proximity, standing alone, is 
sufficient to establish causation.120 And others have at least questioned the 
extent to which Nassar has changed the analysis and whether mere 
temporal proximity can ever be sufficient to satisfy the but-for standard.121 
Finally, Nassar may also have impact beyond Title VII retaliation 
cases. Federal courts are currently grappling with whether the stricter but-
for causation standard applies to retaliation cases brought under the 
ADA.122 Nassar may also limit protection from retaliation at the state level 
as state courts are likewise confronting how Nassar impacts the 
interpretation of their own discrimination statutes that contain anti-
retaliation provisions.123 
                                                     
119. Mobley v. Allstate Ins. Co., 531 F.3d 539, 549 (7th Cir. 2008).  
120. See Shaninga v. St. Luke’s Med. Ctr. LP, No. CV-14-02475-PHX-GMS, 2016 WL 1408289, 
at *11 (D. Ariz. Apr. 11, 2016); Montgomery v. Trs. of Univ. of Ala., No. 2:12–CV–2148–WMA, 
2015 WL 1893471, at *4 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 27, 2015); Ellorin v. Applied Finishing, Inc., 996 F. Supp. 
2d 1070, 1091 (W.D. Wash. 2014); Williams v. Serra Chevrolet Auto., LLC, 4 F. Supp. 3d 865, 879 
(E.D. Mich. 2014). 
121. See White v. Caterpillar Logistics, Inc., 67 F. Supp. 3d 713, 724 (E.D.N.C. 2014) (noting the 
dispute among lower courts regarding the effect of Nassar, including the temporal proximity issue); 
Taylor v. Peninsula Reg’l Med. Ctr., 3 F. Supp. 3d 462, 472 (D. Md. 2014) (stating court did not 
believe that Nassar significantly impacts the causation analysis where plaintiff relies upon temporal 
proximity); cases cited supra note 120. But see Montell v. Diversified Clinical Servs., Inc., 757 F.3d 
497, 505 (6th Cir. 2014) (restating post-Nassar that mere temporal proximity may be sufficient); Zann 
Kwan v. Andalex Grp. LLC, 737 F.3d 834, 845 (2d Cir. 2013) (“[T]he [Nassar] but-for causation 
standard does not alter the plaintiff’s ability to demonstrate causation at the prima facie stage on 
summary judgment or at trial indirectly through temporal proximity.”); Hubbard v. Ga. Farm Bureau 
Mut. Ins. Co., No. 5:11–CV–290 (CAR), 2013 WL 3964908, at *2 (M.D. Ga. July 13, 2014) 
(concluding that Nassar’s heightened but-for causation standard did not prevent plaintiff from raising 
an issue of material fact regarding causation when the temporal proximity between protected conduct 
and adverse action was “very close”); Pierce v. Universal Steel of N.C., LCC, No. 1:13CV158, 2014 
WL 868858, at *3 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 5, 2014) (“[e]ven after Nassar, courts have adhered to [the] rule” 
that temporal proximity may suffice). 
122. Courts are currently split on this issue. Compare Gallagher v. San Diego Unified Port Dist., 
14 F. Supp. 3d 1380 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (applying Nassar), with Siring v. Or. State Bd. of Higher Educ., 
977 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1062–63 (D. Or. 2013) (declining to apply Nassar).  
123. See Gonska v. Highland View Manor, No. CV126030032S, 2014 WL 3893100, at *7 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. June 26, 2014) (declining to follow Nassar for purposes of interpreting state anti-retaliation 
provision). 
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III. A TALE OF TWO STATUTES: HOW THE STORY OF 
RETALIATION LAW TRACKS THE STORY OF DISABILITY 
LAW 
In many ways, the story arc of modern retaliation law tracks the story 
arc of modern disability law. In both cases, a period of initial optimism 
regarding the ability of the relevant federal statutes to effectuate positive 
change eventually gave way to a judicial backlash that limited the reach 
of the laws. The following Part explores the similarities between the two 
areas of law and offers some explanations as to the source of judicial 
backlash in both cases. 
A. The Americans with Disabilities Act: Promise, Backlash, and 
Legislative Intervention 
As this Article posits, the story regarding the evolution of the law 
regarding disability discrimination closely parallels that of the evolution 
of the law regarding workplace retaliation. Therefore, it is first necessary 
to briefly tell the story of the rise, fall, and rebirth of the ADA. 
1. High Hopes 
The ADA was enacted in 1990 with the goal of providing equality of 
opportunity for individuals with disabilities.124 Under the employment 
provisions of the Act, an employer is prohibited from discriminating 
against a qualified individual with a disability.125 Importantly, the term 
“discrimination” includes not only traditional forms of discrimination but 
also the failure to make reasonable accommodations.126 Thus, employers 
are required under the ADA to make reasonable modifications to their 
workplaces and practices to enable individuals with disabilities to enjoy 
equal opportunity in the workplace. 
Prior to its passage, individuals with disabilities were protected from 
discrimination through a hodgepodge of state and federal statutes that 
provided only limited protection.127 The most significant of these laws 
                                                     
124. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 2(a)(8), 104 Stat. 327, 329 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (2012)). 
125. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). 
126. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A). 
127. See Alex B. Long, “If the Train Should Jump the Track . . .”: Divergent Interpretations of 
State and Federal Employment Discrimination Statutes, 40 GA. L. REV. 469, 477–78 (2006) 
(describing the statutory scheme providing protection from disability discrimination at the time of the 
ADA’s enactment). 
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was section 504 of the federal Rehabilitation Act.128 As enacted, section 
504 provided that “[n]o otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the 
United States . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be 
excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving 
Federal financial assistance.”129 
Because section 504 only reached discrimination by federal 
government actors and those receiving federal financial assistance, the 
scope of the statute was somewhat limited.130 There were relatively few 
judicial decisions interpreting section 504’s “otherwise qualified 
handicapped individual” (later re-termed “disability”) language prior to 
the ADA’s passage.131 Despite the relative lack of decisional law, the 
prevailing narrative has long been that federal courts rarely stopped to 
question whether an individual had a “disability” for purposes of the 
Act.132 Instead, the primary focus was on whether the individual with the 
disability was “qualified.” While there was the occasional outlier case in 
                                                     
128. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (current version at 
29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012)). 
129. Id. 
130. Michael Selmi, Interpreting the Americans with Disabilities Act: Why the Supreme Court 
Rewrote the Statute, and Why Congress Did Not Care, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522, 535 (2008) 
(referring to the Act as a “very modest” statute). 
131. Mary Crossley, The Disability Kaleidoscope, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 631 (1999); see 
also Steven B. Epstein, In Search of a Bright Line: Determining When an Employer’s Financial 
Hardship Becomes “Undue” Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 48 VAND. L. REV. 391, 433 
(1995). 
132. See, e.g., Kevin Barry, Toward Universalism: What the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 Can 
and Can’t Do for Disability Rights, 31 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 203, 233 (2010) (“With a few 
exceptions, courts considered anyone alleging discrimination based on an impairment to be 
‘disabled.’”); Susan Stefan, Delusions of Rights: Americans with Psychiatric Disabilities, 
Employment Discrimination and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 52 ALA. L. REV. 271, 301–02 
(2000) (discussing plaintiffs’ success on this issue and stating “Congress had no reason to believe 
when it passed the ADA that the courts would closely scrutinize” the question of whether an 
individual had a disability); Hillary K. Valderrama, Is the ADAAA a “Quick Fix” or Are We Out of 
the Frying Pan and into the Fire: How Requiring Parties to Participate in the Interactive Process 
Can Effect Congressional Intent Under the ADAAA, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 175, 192 (2010) (stating “the 
courts had generally interpreted the definition in favor of plaintiffs”). 
Professor Chai Feldblum, one of the original authors of the ADA, has provided this account of the 
pre-ADA caselaw: 
Courts deciding cases under that definition had decided that individuals with a wide range of 
serious medical conditions could invoke the protections of the law. Indeed, courts had rarely 
even parsed the language of the definition to decide whether a plaintiff was a “handicapped 
individual” under the law. Rather, the definition was understood to include any medical 
condition that was non-trivial, and the courts had applied the law’s coverage in that manner. 
Chai R. Feldblum, Definition of Disability Under Federal Anti-Discrimination Law: What 
Happened? Why? And What Can We Do About It?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91, 91–92 (2000). 
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which a defendant successfully challenged the existence of a disability, 
the narrative surrounding section 504 has been that courts generally took 
a liberal view of the definition of disability. As such, disability rights 
advocates were optimistic that the statute provided a solid working model 
when they began drafting what would become the ADA.133 
Any concerns that disability rights advocates might have had about the 
ability of the Rehabilitation Act’s definition of disability to serve as a 
model for the ADA were apparently alleviated by the Supreme Court’s 
decision in 1989 in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline,134 
however.135 In Arline, the Supreme Court gave an expansive reading to 
the terms in the Act’s definition of disability.136 Indeed, the Court spent 
relatively little time focusing on the statutory definition and instead 
focused heavily on the purposes underlying the statute.137 So, when 
disability rights advocates began work on the ADA and used the 
                                                     
133. See Feldblum, supra note 132, at 113 (describing the false sense of security disability rights 
advocates had at the time). The reality of section 504’s effectiveness as a model for defining the 
concept of “disability” was actually more complicated. In some instances, defendants simply did not 
challenge the existence of a disability in section 504 cases. See id. at 108, 138 (stating it was rare for 
courts to question whether a plaintiff had a disability and that lawyers increasingly focused on this 
issue following passage of the ADA). As section 504 decisional law developed over time, more 
decisions emerged in which plaintiffs were unable to satisfy the threshold question of whether a 
disability existed under the statute. In 1984, a federal court stated that there was only one decision in 
which a court concluded that a plaintiff was unable to establish the existence of a disability. Tudyman 
v. United Airlines, 608 F. Supp. 739, 745–46 (C.D. Cal. 1984). In fact, there were others. See Stevens 
v. Stubbs, 576 F. Supp. 1409, 1414 (N.D. Ga. 1983); E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088, 
1092 (D. Haw. 1980). As the decade progressed, more plaintiffs lost on this issue. Forrisi v. Bowen, 
794 F.2d 931, 934 (4th Cir. 1986); Oesterling v. Walters, 760 F.2d 859, 861 (8th Cir. 1985); Fuqua 
v. Unisys Corp., 716 F. Supp. 1201, 1205–07 (D. Minn. 1989); Elstner v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 659 F. 
Supp. 1328, 1342–43 (S.D. Tex. 1987); Pridemore v. Legal Aid Soc’y of Dayton, 625 F. Supp. 1171, 
1175 (S.D. Ohio 1985). In these cases, courts began to parse the definition of disability found in the 
statute and apply it with a certain amount of rigor. See Forrisi, 794 F.2d at 934 (noting the “limiting 
adjectives” in the statutory definition of disability and concluding that the Act protects only the “truly 
disabled”). For disability rights advocates who were paying attention, there were certainly warning 
signs that the statutory text of section 504’s definition of disability potentially posed some problems 
for future plaintiffs. See Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., “Substantially Limited” Protection from Disability 
Discrimination: The Special Treatment Model and Misconstructions of the Definition of Disability, 
42 VILL. L. REV. 409, 432 (1997) (noting that the Rehabilitation Act’s first definition of disability is 
“worded in restrictive terms”). 
134. 480 U.S. 273 (1987). 
135. See Feldblum, supra note 132, at 92 (stating that “there seemed to be little legal need to change 
the definition of ‘disability’ for the ADA” following Arline). 
136. See Selmi, supra note 130, at 537 (discussing the expansive approach of Arline). 
137. Arline, 480 U.S. at 281–82; see Feldblum, supra note 132, at 118 (noting that “[t]he Court did 
not engage at any length with the statutory definition of ‘handicapped individual’” and that “the 
simplicity and breeziness with which the Supreme Court” dealt with the text “is almost breathtaking 
in its naivete” compared to subsequent decisions); Long, supra note 48, at 543 (arguing that the Court 
glossed over the statutory definition). 
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Rehabilitation Act as the model for the new legislation, they did so with 
the belief that future courts would take a similarly expansive view of the 
ADA.138 They would soon learn how mistaken they were. 
2. Judicial Backlash 
The ADA was enacted in 1990 with great fanfare.139 In addition to 
addressing discrimination at hotels, restaurants, and other places of public 
accommodation, the Act expanded the statutory protection against 
disability discrimination to the private employment sector.140 Congress 
estimated at the time that there were over 43 million Americans with a 
disability.141 In light of the fact that the new law would cover private 
workplaces, it was easy to foresee that there would be far more cases 
brought under the ADA than had been brought under the Rehabilitation 
Act. Indeed, within the first two years of the ADA’s existence, there were 
over 30,000 charges of employment discrimination filed with the 
EEOC.142 In contrast, there had only been a total of 265 lawsuits filed 
under the Rehabilitation Act when the ADA was enacted, and those suits 
covered not just employment discrimination but also education, housing, 
and other forms of discrimination.143 
As the decisional law under the ADA developed in the 1990s, disability 
rights advocates became alarmed over the increased attention that 
defendants and courts were paying to the preliminary question of whether 
a plaintiff had a disability.144 ADA plaintiffs increasingly found 
themselves having to satisfy the preliminary question of whether they had 
disabilities. And as courts increasingly turned their attention to the 
statutory definition of “disability,” ADA plaintiffs increasingly 
encountered greater difficulties meeting the statutory definition.145 
                                                     
138. See Selmi, supra note 130, at 537 (explaining that Arline “almost certainly sealed the 
subsequent decision to incorporate the Rehab Act’s definition into the ADA”). 
139. See Bradley A. Areheart, Accommodating Pregnancy, 67 ALA. L. REV. 1125, 1145 n.129 
(2015) (noting that sponsors of the Act referred to it at the time as the “‘emancipation proclamation’ 
for people with disabilities”); Stefan, supra note 132, at 271 (describing the optimism surrounding 
enactment of the Act). 
140. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, §§ 101–07, 302(a), 104 Stat. 
327, 330–37, 355 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–17, 12182(a) (2012)). 
141. Id. § 2(a)(1), 104 Stat. at 328. 
142. Epstein, supra note 131, at 433–34. 
143. Id.  
144. Feldblum, supra note 132, at 139. 
145. Id. at 138–39. 
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In 1999, the Supreme Court formalized the narrow view of the concept 
of a “disability” under the ADA through a trilogy of decisions that 
dramatically narrowed the scope of the statute.146 Adopting a narrow 
approach to the terms in the statutory definition, the Court held that an 
individual’s use of mitigating measures to compensate for the effects of 
an impairment—such as eyeglass, prescription medication, or even the 
individual’s own unconscious attempts to adapt to an impairment—must 
be taken into account when determining whether an individual is 
substantially limited in a major life activity.147 In addition, the Court took 
a narrow view of what it means to be substantially limited in the major 
life activity of working, concluding that one must be precluded from a 
class of jobs or broad range of jobs.148 In 2002, the Court followed up with 
an explicit statement that the terms in the ADA’s definition of disability 
need to be interpreted strictly “to create a demanding standard for 
qualifying as disabled.”149 
As these decisions filtered down to the lower courts, the situation 
became fairly grim for ADA plaintiffs. Physical and mental impairments 
that disability rights supporters had long assumed would always qualify 
as disabilities—such as multiple sclerosis,150 cancer,151 HIV infection,152 
cerebral palsy,153 and bipolar disorder154—were increasingly held by 
courts not to qualify.155 Studies soon consistently revealed astonishingly 
low success rates for ADA plaintiffs.156 In the vast majority of reported 
decisions, ADA plaintiffs were unable to clear the initial hurdle of 
establishing the existence of a disability157—the legal issue disability 
                                                     
146. See Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 
527 U.S. 516 (1999); Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999).  
147. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. at 566. 
148. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 493. 
149. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002). 
150. Sorensen v. Univ. of Utah Hosp., 194 F.3d 1084, 1085 (10th Cir. 1999). 
151. Hirsch v. Nat’l Mall & Serv., Inc., 989 F. Supp. 977, 980–82 (N.D. Ill. 1997). 
152. Blanks v. Sw. Bell Commc’ns, Inc., 310 F.3d 398 (5th Cir. 2002). 
153. Holt v. Grand Lake Mental Health Ctr., Inc., 443 F.3d 762, 766–67 (10th Cir. 2006). 
154. Horwitz v. L & J.G. Stickley, Inc., 122 F. Supp. 2d 350 (N.D.N.Y. 2000). 
155. See Alex B. Long, Introducing the New and Improved Americans with Disabilities Act: 
Assessing the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 217, 217 (2008) 
(discussing coverage issues under the ADA). 
156. See Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 108 (1999) (relating details of study showing plaintiffs lost 94% of cases at the 
trial court level between 1992 and 1998). 
157. See Sharona Hoffman, Corrective Justice and Title I of the ADA, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 1213, 
1215 (2003) (citing study reporting low plaintiff success rates and attributing much of the failure to 
the inability of plaintiffs to satisfy the ADA’s definition of disability). 
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rights advocates, based on earlier decisions, had assumed would rarely 
even be at issue.158 In short, all of the initial excitement that accompanied 
the ADA eventually gave way to the sense that the federal courts had 
effectively gutted the statute. 
3. A New Beginning, a New Backlash 
Ultimately, the perceived ADA backlash from courts led to a backlash 
from Congress. In 2008, Congress amended the ADA, focusing almost 
exclusively on the definition of disability. In the Findings and Purposes 
accompanying the ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA), Congress 
expressly disapproved of the Supreme Court’s restrictive interpretations 
of the terms in the ADA’s definition of disability.159 The ADAAA 
substantially broadened the definition of disability, thus providing 
significantly greater coverage for individuals with a variety of physical 
and mental impairments. 
Despite Congress’s intervention, there remain concerns that lower 
courts continue to unduly limit the reach of the statute. The new definition 
of “disability” is expansive enough, and the accompanying Findings and 
Purposes specific enough, that plaintiffs now face less difficulty in 
establishing the existence of a disability.160 However, as Professor 
Michelle A. Travis has suggested, lower courts have found new ways to 
“avoid the difficult questions of accommodation.”161 To be protected 
under the Act, it is not enough that one simply have a disability. To be 
protected and to be entitled to a reasonable accommodation, one must be 
qualified. To be qualified, one must be capable of performing the essential 
                                                     
158. See supra notes 124–32 and accompanying text. 
159. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, §§ 2, 4(a), 122 Stat. 3553, 3553–56. 
160. See Stephen F. Befort, An Empirical Examination of Case Outcomes Under the ADA 
Amendments Act, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2027, 2051, 2057–58 (2013) (finding improved success 
rate for ADA plaintiffs in federal courts on threshold issue of disability); Nicole Buonocore Porter, 
The New ADA Backlash, 82 TENN. L. REV. 1, 46–47 (2014) (“[A]nyone who has studied disability 
law cases can easily ascertain a clear distinction between pre-ADAAA cases, where courts went out 
of their way to find that various impairments were not disabilities, and post-ADAAA cases, where at 
least some courts seem to be bending over backward to find individuals disabled (or at least allow 
those plaintiffs to survive summary judgment on the issue).”); Michelle A. Travis, Disqualifying 
Universality Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1689, 1694 (stating 
“the ADAAA largely eliminated courts’ ability to use disability status as the law’s gatekeeper”).  
161. See Travis, supra note 160, at 1695. 
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functions of a position, with or without reasonable accommodation.162 The 
ADAAA did not amend this portion of the ADA.163 
Rather than relying upon the “disability” as the gatekeeper to coverage 
under the ADA, courts now seem to be relying upon the “qualified” 
language as the gatekeeper and, in particular, the “essential functions” 
portion of that language.164 The EEOC regulations and Interpretive 
Guidance accompanying the ADA describe the essential functions of a 
job in terms of the duties of the job, such as typing, proofreading, or 
operating a cash register.165 In her study of post-ADAAA federal court 
decisions, Professor Nicole Buonocore Porter observed that rather than 
limiting the “essential function” concept to actual job duties or tasks, 
courts frequently treat various workplace norms—such as working a 
rotating shift or working certain hours—as essential functions. For 
example, in a workplace where the ability to work the day or night shift 
was a norm, an employee who could not work the night shift due to a 
disability was held not to be able to perform the essential function of the 
position.166 And as an employer is not required to eliminate an essential 
function of a position under the ADA, courts often hold that the individual 
is not qualified and is thus not entitled to the protection of the ADA.167 
Professor Michelle Travis has also noted the tendency of courts to 
mischaracterize an employer’s qualification standards as essential job 
functions.168 According to the EEOC, the phrase “qualification standards” 
refers to the personal and professional attributes of an employee, such as 
“skill, experience, education,” etc., that the employer establishes as 
requirements for a position.169 The definition is significant because the 
ADA prohibits an employer from utilizing qualification standards that 
screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability or a class 
of individuals unless the employer can show that the standard is job 
                                                     
162. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2012). 
163. See Long, supra note 155, at 228–29 (noting the failure of Congress to amend the reasonable 
accommodation portion of the statute). 
164. See Travis, supra note 160, at 1697 (explaining that “the qualification requirement is being 
used to replace disability status as the new gatekeeper for ADA protection” and that “the ‘essential 
functions’ component of the qualifications test has become the critical source for undermining the 
ADAAA”). 
165. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n) (2017); 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(n). 
166. See Porter, supra note 160, at 74 (citing Tucker v. Mo. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., No. 2:11-CV-
04134-NKL, 2012 WL 6115604, at *1 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 10, 2012)). 
167. See id. at 70 (citing cases). 
168. Travis, supra note 160, at 1721. 
169. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(q). 
07 - Long.docx  (Do Not Delete) 5/26/2018  5:27 PM 
744 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:715 
 
related and consistent with business necessity.170 Thus, the employer bears 
the burden of establishing the need for a particular qualification standard 
under the strict business necessity standard. In contrast, because the ADA 
only protects qualified individuals with disabilities, the employee bears 
the burden of establishing either that a job function is not essential or that 
the employee can perform the function in order to establish that the 
employee is qualified. As Professor Travis has noted, after the passage of 
the ADAAA, employer groups began encouraging employers to list things 
like education and experience requirements—which clearly fall under the 
category of qualification standards that need to be affirmatively justified 
by the employer on business necessity grounds—as essential job functions 
in their job descriptions.171 Some courts have gone along with these kinds 
of mischaracterizations, with the result being that an employee who lacks 
the education or experience requirements established by an employer is 
deemed by the court unable to perform the essential functions of a position 
and, hence, not a qualified individual. 
On the one hand, these results are not terribly surprising. EEOC 
Interpretive Guidance and longstanding judicial precedent both 
emphasize the idea of preserving employer discretion surrounding which 
job functions should be deemed essential.172 At the same time, these kinds 
of decisions are flatly inconsistent with the language of the Act and the 
regulations. By mischaracterizing workplace structural norms and 
qualification standards as essential functions, courts make it significantly 
more difficult for plaintiffs to establish that they are qualified under the 
ADA. 
B. Explanations for the ADA Backlash 
So what caused the original raft of restrictive holdings regarding the 
ADA’s definition of disability and the more recent restrictive 
interpretations of the essential function concept among federal courts? 
One explanation might be that the restrictive decisions under the ADA 
simply reflect the proper or at least a better interpretation of the ADA’s 
                                                     
170. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) (2012). 
171. Travis, supra note 160, at 1723. 
172. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(n) (explaining that the inquiry into whether a function is essential 
“is not intended to second guess an employer’s business judgment with regard to productions 
standards”); Travis, supra note 160, at 1701 (discussing pre-ADAAA court deference to an 
employer’s definition of “essential functions” if listed as part of a job description before litigation). 
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text than the earlier decisions under the Rehabilitation Act. While 
plausible on its face, this explanation is not completely satisfying.173 
Under the ADA’s original definition of disability, a plaintiff needed to 
establish the existence of a physical or mental impairment that 
substantially limited one or more major life activities, a record of such an 
impairment, or that the employer regarded the plaintiff as having such an 
impairment.174 To be sure, some of the earlier decisions under the 
Rehabilitation Act tended to gloss over the adverb “substantially” and the 
adjective “major” in that definition.175 But the fact that those terms appear 
in the definition of disability is only evidence of the inherently ambiguous 
nature of the definition. There is no self-evident meaning of the terms 
“substantially limits” and “major life activities.” This ambiguity provided 
courts with substantial leeway when interpreting those terms. 
It would hardly be a stretch, for example, to conclude that one who can 
only see out of one eye is substantially limited in the major life activity of 
seeing, regardless of any sort of unconscious, physiological coping 
mechanisms one may employ to correct for the results of the impairment. 
Moreover, a resort to the legislative history accompanying the ADA and 
other tools of statutory construction might have easily led a court to the 
conclusion that this sort of impairment should qualify as an actual 
disability or at least that individuals with such impairments who faced 
adverse actions from their employers were regarded by their employers as 
having such impairments.176 The ADA’s legislative history cited Arline 
and similar decisional law under the Rehabilitation Act extensively and 
indicated that courts should take a similarly expansive approach regarding 
the interpretation of the ADA’s definition of disability.177 Yet in 
Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg,178 the Supreme Court held that an 
individual who could see out of only eye was not necessarily substantially 
limited in the major life activity of seeing.179 Subsequent lower court 
                                                     
173. See Kevin M. Barry, Exactly What Congress Intended?, 17 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 5, 10–
14 (2013) (discussing text-based arguments against the Court’s holdings). 
174. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). 
175. See, e.g., Grube v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 550 F. Supp. 418, 418 (E.D. Pa. 1982) 
(concluding that plaintiff, who was missing a kidney but whose other kidney fully compensated for 
loss, was entitled to relief). 
176. See Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 499–503 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(discussing legislative history undermining majority opinion in Sutton). 
177. See Mark C. Weber, Unreasonable Accommodation and Due Hardship, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1119, 
1139 n.83 (2010) (noting that references to Arline are “sprinkled throughout the ADA legislative 
history”); Feldblum, supra note 132, at 130–32 (discussing Arline’s role in the legislative history). 
178. 527 U.S. 555 (1999). 
179. Id. at 567. 
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decisions found that similarly situated individuals were not substantially 
limited in the major life activity of seeing.180 
Despite the obvious ambiguity in the terms “substantially limited” and 
“major life activities,” the Supreme Court eschewed any need to resort to 
legislative history, explaining that the statutory text was clear and 
compelled, in the Supreme Court’s words, the creation of a “demanding 
standard” for qualifying as having a disability.181 Thus, in the face of 
ambiguous statutory language, legislative history suggesting an expansive 
approach, and decisional law taking the completely opposite approach, 
one can hardly be blamed for believing that courts were influenced by 
something more than mere statutory text. 
Dismayed commentators devoted considerable time and effort to 
exploring what they perceived to be the “ADA backlash” or “disability 
backlash” from the courts. Commentators offered various explanations for 
the perceived judicial hostility to the ADA’s definition of disability. 
According to some, the problem was that many judges failed to grasp the 
ADA’s reliance on a civil rights model for addressing disability 
discrimination and instead viewed the Act as bestowing special benefits 
for people with disabilities.182 Under this theory, courts viewed the ADA’s 
reasonable accommodation requirement as a requirement that employers 
provide preferential treatment to people with physical or mental 
impairments. Bothered by that idea, courts sought to limit the number of 
potential claimants.183 Closely related to this explanation was the 
explanation that courts were frustrated by the dramatic increase in the 
number of cases coming onto their dockets that involved what they 
perceived to be relatively trivial issues.184 Facing an increase in the 
                                                     
180. See, e.g., Flores v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 184 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1292–93 (S.D. Fla. 2002); Rivera 
v. Apple Indus. Corp., 148 F. Supp. 2d 202, 214 (E.D.N.Y. 2001). 
181. See Toyota Motor Mfg., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002). 
182. Matthew Diller, Judicial Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights Model, 21 BERKELEY J. 
EMP. & LAB. L. 19, 23–24 (2000). 
183. See Porter, supra note 160, at 5 (2014). 
184. See Stephen F. Befort, Let’s Try This Again: The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 Attempts to 
Reinvigorate the “Regarded as” Prong of the Statutory Definition of Disability, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 
993, 1000 (“Perhaps as a partial response to the burdens of this growing caseload, federal court 
decisions began to adopt a more restrictive view of the ADA’s disability definition.”). Befort cites as 
an example a sentence in an ADA decision from the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in which the 
court expressed frustration that the ADA “had the potential of being the greatest generator of litigation 
ever, and that the court doubted whether Congress, in its wildest dreams or wildest nightmares, 
intended to turn every garden variety worker’s compensation claim into a federal case.” Id. at 1000 
n.56 (quoting Pedigo v. P.A.M. Transp., 891 F. Supp. 482, 485 (W.D. Ark. 1994), rev’d, 60 F.3d 1300 
(8th Cir. 1995)); see also Peter David Blanck & Mollie Weighner Marti, Attitudes, Behavior and the 
Employment Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 VILL. L. REV. 345, 369 (1997) 
(noting that over 80,000 charges of employment discrimination with the EEOC in the five years the 
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number of claims from individuals whom they have viewed as seeking 
special treatment, skeptical courts were attempting to narrow the scope of 
the statute so that it only protected those who, in the courts’ view, were 
“truly disabled.”185 
The final explanation incorporates some of these same ideas but offers 
a slight twist. The question of whether an individual with a disability is 
qualified requires a court to consider whether the individual can perform 
the essential functions of a position with a reasonable accommodation. In 
turn, the question of whether a proposed accommodation is reasonable 
requires courts to delve into the minutiae of the workplace and to evaluate 
the discretionary decisions as to that minutiae.186 Therefore, one 
explanation for the disability backlash is that courts were anxious to avoid 
engaging in this type of hard look and instead chose to focus heavily on 
the preliminary question of whether an individual has a disability. In other 
words, a strict reading of the definition of disability served, in the words 
of Professors Samuel Issacharoff and Justin Nelson, as “a gatekeeping 
mechanism” that allowed courts to avoid thorny questions concerning the 
reasonable accommodation concept.187 Indeed, in his dissenting opinion 
in Sutton, Justice Stevens expressed a similar view, suggesting that the 
majority’s restrictive interpretation of the ADA’s definition of disability 
was based, in part, on “a concern that their decision will legalize issues 
best left to the private sphere.”188 In short, by adopting a strict interpretive 
approach to the definition of disability, courts could avoid being in the 
position of having to second-guess employer decision-making concerning 
the day-to-day operations of the workplace. 
The very nature of the reasonable accommodation requirement impacts 
employers’ discretion as to how to structure their workplaces in a way that 
other anti-discrimination statutes do not. Under traditional anti-
discrimination statutes, employers are simply prohibited from taking into 
                                                     
statute became effective); Diller, supra note 182, at 50 (suggesting federal courts viewed the ADA as 
an example of the type of statute “that clutter[s] up the dockets of federal courts”). 
185. Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 934 (4th Cir. 1986). 
186. Wernick v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 91 F.3d 379, 384 (2d Cir. 1996) (“[N]othing in the 
law leads us to conclude that in enacting the disability acts, Congress intended to interfere with 
personnel decisions within an organizational hierarchy.”); see also Samuel Issacharoff & Justin 
Nelson, Discrimination with a Difference: Can Employment Discrimination Law Accommodate the 
Americans with Disabilities Act?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 307, 336–37 (2001) (noting that the analysis of 
whether an individual is qualified may require a court “to delve into the factual minutia of each 
individual case”). 
187. Issacharoff & Nelson, supra note 186, at 321. 
188. Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 513 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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account race, sex, or other factors in their decisions.189 In contrast, it is 
discrimination under the ADA for an employer to fail to make reasonable 
modifications to the employer’s policies and practices in the case of an 
individual with a disability.190 Thus, it may be reasonable under the 
circumstances for an employee to demand that the employer allow the 
employee to begin the work day earlier or later than scheduled,191 to work 
on a part-time basis instead of a full-time basis,192 to work from home,193 
to require a supervisor to provide more detailed instructions or to 
otherwise alter her supervisory style,194 to make an exception to an 
existing leave policy,195 or to make an exception to an existing seniority 
system.196 In short, the reasonable accommodation requirement is 
sweeping in its scope in that it potentially impacts virtually all employer-
established workplace policies and practices.197 
This theory also best explains the courts’ mishandling of the ADA’s 
essential function concept. By misclassifying certain workplace structural 
norms—such as the ability to work a rotating shift—as essential functions 
of a position that an employer is not required to waive, courts are able to 
avoid having to question an employer’s judgment as to why such a waiver 
would not be a reasonable accommodation. Likewise, by misclassifying 
educational requirements and the like as essential functions, courts are 
                                                     
189. To the extent a statute prohibits an employer from employing a neutral practice that has a 
disparate impact on a particular group, the ADA is similar. See EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 227 
F.3d 1024, 1028 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting the similarity). 
190. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2012). 
191. See id. § 12111(9)(B) (listing modified work schedules as a reasonable accommodation). 
192. Id. (listing part-time work schedules as a reasonable accommodation). 
193. See Core v. Champaign Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, No. 3:11-cv-166(TSB), 2012 WL 3073418, 
at *4 (S.D. Ohio July 30, 2012) (recognizing that working from home can potentially be a reasonable 
accommodation). 
194. See Kravits v. Shinseki, No. CIV.A. 10-861(GLL), 2012 WL 604169, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 
24, 2012) (concluding a triable issue existed as to whether requiring employer to provide more 
detailed instructions was a reasonable accommodation); Bennett v. Unisys Corp., No. 2:99-CV-
0446(FVA), 2000 WL 33126583, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 2000) (holding that adjusting supervisory 
methods could potentially be a reasonable accommodation); Alex B. Long, Reasonable 
Accommodation as Professional Responsibility, Reasonable Accommodation as Professionalism, 47 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1753, 1762 (2014) (discussing the reluctance of employers to make these types 
of accommodations). 
195. See Garcia-Ayala v. Lederle Parenterals, Inc., 212 F.3d 638, 647–48 (1st Cir. 2000) 
(recognizing that permitting an employee to extend her medical leave beyond that allowed under the 
company’s own policy could be a reasonable accommodation). 
196. U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 403 (2002). 
197. See id. at 418 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing decision and stating that as a result of the 
decision, “all workplace rules are eligible to be used as vehicles of accommodation” (emphasis in 
original)). 
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able to avoid delving into the minutiae of the workplace and potentially 
placing themselves in a position where they might have to second-guess 
an employer’s decisions. 
Of course, the ADA and its accompanying regulations go to 
considerable lengths not to unduly impact employer discretion.198 But 
courts have nonetheless frequently expressed concern over second-
guessing employers regarding their decisions about whether to provide an 
employee’s requested accommodation.199 Thus, one of the more 
compelling explanations for why courts took such a strict approach to 
defining the concept of “disability” under the ADA is that they realized 
that if they did not do so, they would be compelled to more often dig deep 
into the minutiae of an individual workplace and second-guess an 
employer’s refusal to provide an employee’s requested accommodation. 
C. Similarities Between the History of the ADA and the History of 
Retaliation Law 
There are numerous similarities in terms of the narratives surrounding 
the ADA and retaliation law. In both fields, early successes gave rise to 
misplaced optimism. And in both fields, initial optimism eventually gave 
way to judicial backlash. The following section examines the similarities 
in more detail and offers some additional explanation as to the source of 
the judicial backlash in the case of employment retaliation law. 
                                                     
198. See supra note 172 and accompanying text (discussing the deference given to employer 
discretion regarding which functions are essential). 
199. See Rehrs v. Iams Co., 486 F.3d 353, 358 (8th Cir. 2007) (concluding that the ability to rotate 
shifts was an essential function of position and stating that “[i]t is not the province of the court to 
question the legitimate operation of a production facility or determine what is the most productive or 
efficient shift schedule for a facility”); Kaitschuck v. Doc’s Drugs, Ltd., No. 13-C-1985, 2014 WL 
1478017, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 15, 2014) (refusing to require employer to waive its certification 
requirement for eligibility for a job on the grounds that the court does not “sit as a kind of super-
personnel department” (quoting Magnus v. St. Mark United Methodist Church, 688 F.3d 331, 338–
39 (7th Cir. 2012)); EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., No. 11-13742, 2012 WL 3945540, at *5 (E.D. Mich. 
Sept. 10, 2012) (declining to “second-guess” employer’s business judgment regarding whether it was 
essential for employee to be present at the office); Wood v. Crown Redi-Mix, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 
1094, 1104 (S.D. Iowa 2002) (deferring to employer’s judgment that the ability to drive a ready-mix 
truck in an emergency was an essential function that employer was not required to waive and stating 
“it is not its position to question the soundness of Crown’s business judgments”); Lewis v. Zilog, Inc., 
908 F. Supp. 931, 948 (N.D. Ga. 1995) (“Forcing transfers of employees under the guise of reasonably 
accommodating employees under the ADA inherently would undermine an employer’s ability to 
control its own labor force.”). 
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1. Initial Successes Mask Pitfalls of Statutory Language: The 
Histories of the ADA and Retaliation Law 
a. Initial Successes Mask Pitfalls of Statutory Language: The ADA 
In both areas, the initial success that plaintiffs enjoyed masked 
underlying areas of concern inherent in the relevant statutory language. In 
the ADA context, disability rights advocates were lulled into a false sense 
of security by generally favorable decisional law under the Rehabilitation 
Act.200 This sense of security reached its peak with the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Arline, in which the Court spent little time parsing the statutory 
definition of definition and gave an expansive reading to the statute.201 
One explanation for the inability of disability rights advocates to 
predict the subsequent string of pro-defendant decisions lies in the 
changing approach to statutory interpretation that took place during this 
period. Looked at through the lens of the textualist approach that 
dominates modern statutory interpretation, the text of the ADA’s original 
definition of disability seems anything but pro-plaintiff. To establish the 
existence of an actual disability, a plaintiff was required to establish the 
existence of an impairment that substantially limited a major life 
activity.202 The modifying words “substantially” and “major” potentially 
imposed a not-insignificant burden on a plaintiff. And while the two 
alternate definitions permitted a plaintiff to qualify as disabled by 
establishing a record of such an impairment, or that the defendant 
regarded the plaintiff as having such an impairment, those definitions also 
utilized the same modifying terms.203 In hindsight, the potential 
deficiencies of the definition from a plaintiff’s perspective should have 
been obvious. 
Why, then, were they not? Part of the explanation has to do with the 
fact that the ADA was born at the same time that textualism was becoming 
the dominant approach to statutory interpretation.204 In the 1970s and ‘80s, 
when courts were reviewing the language of the Rehabilitation Act that 
served as the basis for the ADA’s definition, textualism was not the force 
                                                     
200. See supra notes 138–41 and accompanying text. 
201. See supra notes 138–41 and accompanying text. 
202. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2012). 
203. Id. 
204. See Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 30, 30 n.125 
(2006) (discussing how textualism began to displace purposivism during the 1980s and 1990s); Jarrod 
Shobe, Intertemporal Statutory Interpretation and the Evolution of Legislative Drafting, 114 COLUM. 
L. REV. 807, 852 (2014) (stating that the shift toward textualism began in the 1980s but accelerated 
through the 1990s). 
07 - Long.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/26/2018  5:27 PM 
2018] RETALIATION BACKLASH 751 
 
it would soon become. Instead, courts were more willing to look to the 
underlying purposes of a statute in construing the language. But by the 
time the ADA went into effect in 1992, textualism was ascending.205 
Reviewing courts in the 1990s were simply less inclined to look to the 
purposes underlying the ADA’s statutory text rather than to focus on the 
text itself. In addition, while the ADA was more dense and more specific 
in terms of its text than older statutes like Title VII, it still contained a 
great deal of ambiguous language.206 Thus, it took textualism to expose 
some of the inherent limitations in the ADA’s definition of disability. 
A related explanation has to do with the fact that the number of 
disability discrimination cases exploded with the birth of the ADA. Prior 
to the ADA, disability discrimination cases in the workplace were fairly 
rare. Once private employers became subject to the requirements of the 
ADA, the number of discrimination cases naturally increased. The result 
was an increased attention to the language of this strange new law, which 
led to defense attorneys, for the first time, advancing text-based arguments 
in support of the argument that a plaintiff did not have a disability.207 
Ultimately, it took an increase in the number of disability discrimination 
cases and a hard look at the statutory definition of disability to expose 
some of the flaws in the ADA. 
b. Initial Successes Mask Pitfalls of Statutory Language: Retaliation 
Law 
The story of the courts’ treatment of retaliation plaintiffs follows the 
same pattern: early successes masked significant statutory shortcomings. 
Prior to Nassar, most of the Supreme Court’s retaliation decisions 
involved (1) basic threshold questions involving only a fairly limited 
number of potential plaintiffs, such as whether former employees have a 
claim under Title VII,208 whether a friend or relative of the party opposing 
unlawful conduct has a claim under Title VII,209 and whether a particular 
                                                     
205. See Molot, supra note 204, at 30, 30 n.125 (discussing the rise of textualism around this time). 
206. Justice O’Connor was once quoted as saying that the ADA is “an example of what happens 
when the sponsors are so eager to get something passed that what passes hasn’t been as carefully 
written as a group of law professors might put together. So it leaves lots of ambiguities and gaps and 
things for courts to figure out.” William C. Smith, Drawing Boundaries, 88 A.B.A. J. 49, 49 (2002). 
207. Chai Feldblum, one of the original authors of the ADA, tells the story of conducting seminars 
in front of lawyers who were learning about the ADA for the first time shortly before the law went 
into effect. These lawyers, knowing nothing about the prior history of the Rehabilitation Act case law, 
focused heavily on the plain language of the statute. Feldblum, supra note 132, at 138–39. 
208. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997). 
209. Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170 (2011). 
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statute provides for a retaliation cause of action to begin with;210 or (2) 
interpretive issues so confined to the statute in question that they were 
unlikely to have broader application, such as whether a plaintiff who made 
an oral complaint regarding unlawful discrimination under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act had a retaliation claim.211 Thus, while these were all 
victories for retaliation plaintiffs, they were victories of somewhat limited 
precedential value. 
The Supreme Court’s retaliation decisions reflect a strong emphasis on 
textualist analysis; reliance on the purposes underlying the text is typically 
of secondary importance in the opinions.212 As was the case before it with 
the ADA, the statutory text of anti-retaliation provisions is often not as 
plaintiff-friendly as early retaliation decisions might have led some to 
believe. Supreme Court decisions affording retaliation plaintiffs victories 
have tended to be based so strongly on textual grounds that they are of 
limited value for retaliation plaintiffs outside of those narrow 
circumstances. And it was not until the number of retaliation actions 
increased and lower courts were forced to deal with the Supreme Court’s 
rulings that the limitations of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provisions were 
fully exposed. 
The Court’s decision in Crawford—a case generally perceived as a win 
for employees—provides an example. In Crawford, the Supreme Court 
held that an employee who participated in an employer’s internal 
investigation into alleged discrimination and provided “ostensibly 
disapproving” testimony was protected by the opposition clause of Title 
VII’s anti-retaliation provision.213 While a win for future retaliation 
plaintiffs in the sense that the Court concluded that the employee’s 
conduct was protected even though it did not fit the classic form of 
“retaliation” one ordinarily thinks of, the Court’s decision was not as 
protective of employees as one might assume. Title VII’s participation 
clause, unlike the opposition clause, does not impose any sort of good 
faith or reasonableness standard upon an employee seeking its 
protection.214 Thus, the protection afforded by the participation clause is 
virtually absolute. The statutory text of both clauses actually imposed at 
least some obstacles to classifying the plaintiff’s conduct as fitting under 
                                                     
210. Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474 (2008); CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442 
(2008); Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167 (2005). 
211. Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 563 U.S. 1 (2011). 
212. See Long, supra note 48, at 541 (“Textualism has won the war with respect to the 
interpretation of statutory antiretaliation provisions.”). 
213. See supra notes 17–23 and accompanying text. 
214. See supra notes 17–23 and accompanying text. 
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either clause. Had the Court concluded that the Crawford plaintiff’s 
conduct fit within the protections of Title VII’s participation clause, future 
employees who participate in internal investigations into discrimination 
would not have been forced to establish that they reasonably believed they 
were addressing unlawful conduct or that they acted in good faith.215 
Instead, they would have been entitled to the absolute protection of the 
participation clause.216 
There are other examples of how the Court’s textualist approach to the 
interpretation of anti-retaliation provisions has limited the protection 
afforded to retaliation plaintiffs. In Thompson, the Court held that an 
individual who suffers an adverse action due to a coworker’s protected 
activity is an “aggrieved person” under Title VII who is entitled to a 
statutory remedy.217 While certainly a victory for retaliation plaintiffs, it 
is a win of limited value for the victims of retaliation who proceed under 
other statutes. The Court’s decision was premised not on the grounds that 
the aggrieved person was entitled to any sort of derivative right stemming 
from the protected activity of the coworker but instead from a separate 
provision in Title VII affording a remedy to anyone aggrieved by an 
employer’s unlawful retaliation.218 While some other federal employment 
statutes contain this same “aggrieved person” language, others do not.219 
Thus, Thompson is hardly a broad pronouncement regarding the evils of 
third-party retaliation and is instead a quite narrow opinion in which—
fortunately for the plaintiff in question—the text of the statute provided a 
way for the court to address the obvious unjustness of permitting an 
employer to take action against an innocent third party while still toeing 
the textualist line. 
2. Concern over Intrusions into Employer Discretion: The Histories 
of the ADA and Retaliation Law 
The recent histories of disability law and retaliation law are also similar 
in terms of how the courts have viewed the relevant statutes as intruding 
upon employer discretion. With the ADA, courts could easily foresee that 
the statute—with its requirement that an employer provide a reasonable 
accommodation to a qualified individual with a disability—impacted 
                                                     
215. See supra notes 17–23 and accompanying text. 
216. See supra notes 17–23 and accompanying text. 
217. Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170, 177–78 (2011). 
218. Id. at 175; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2012). 
219. For example, the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 
(USERRA) does not contain such a provision. 38 U.S.C. §§ 4322(a), 4323(d) (2012). 
07 - Long.docx  (Do Not Delete) 5/26/2018  5:27 PM 
754 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:715 
 
employer discretion in meaningful ways.220 And with the statute’s 
potential coverage of an estimated 43 million Americans, courts could 
also foresee themselves frequently being dragged into the legal battles 
over workplace minutiae. 
The same fears perhaps explain the tendency of the Supreme Court and 
lower courts to adopt narrow readings and applications of anti-retaliation 
provisions. In some instances, the text of anti-retaliation provisions might 
plausibly be read to produce a plaintiff-friendly result but perhaps more 
easily could be read in a narrower fashion. In these situations, the Supreme 
Court has more often chosen the narrower option. And when presented 
with the opportunity to apply Supreme Court retaliation precedent in a 
manner that would further the purposes underlying statutory anti-
retaliation provisions, lower courts have increasingly applied that 
precedent in a highly restrictive manner. 
Perhaps the clearest example of the Court’s tendency to choose the 
narrower reading as between two plausible readings of statutory text is the 
Court’s 2013 decision in Nassar. Title VII prohibits an employer from 
retaliating against an individual “because” that individual engaged in 
protected activity.221 Faced with the question of what standard of 
causation is imposed by the word “because,” the Court chose the 
demanding “but-for” standard over other, less restrictive standards.222 
Nothing in the text obviously required or even strongly suggested this 
result, and there were compelling arguments for a more expansive reading 
of the word “because.”223 Yet, a five-member majority chose the more 
narrow reading. 
Lower courts have similarly chosen to interpret the Court’s retaliation 
decisions in a particularly narrow fashion. Following Breeden, lower 
courts could have taken into account the complex nature of discrimination 
law when assessing whether an employee could have reasonably believed 
that an employer’s conduct was unlawful. Instead, lower courts have 
frequently adopted a highly restrictive reading of the reasonableness 
                                                     
220. See supra notes 184–85 and accompanying text. 
221. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). 
222. See supra notes 115–23 and accompanying text.  
223. The four dissenting justices raised several concerns regarding the majority opinion. First, by 
adopting a but-for standard, the Court established separate causation standards for discrimination and 
retaliation claims. Aside from creating unnecessary confusion, the creation of a separate standard for 
retaliation claims ignored the interconnected nature of the two theories. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. 
v. Nassar, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2537 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The dissent was also critical 
of the majority’s failure to defer to the EEOC’s position on the issue. Id. at 2543–44. The dissent also 
noted that the adoption of a but-for standard was contrary to tort law’s handling of causation issues 
in which multiple causes contribute to a result. Id. at 2546. 
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requirement.224 Following Burlington Northern, lower courts could have 
recognized the strong deterrent effect that threats of retaliation can have 
on an employee’s willingness to oppose perceived unlawful 
discrimination. Instead, lower courts have increasingly held as a matter of 
law that employer actions such as negative employee evaluations and 
threats of firing would not deter a reasonable employee from opposing 
unlawful discrimination.225 
The obvious question is why would courts consistently choose readings 
of the statutory text and precedent that limit the protection afforded to the 
victims of retaliation? Nassar provides perhaps the clearest answer. The 
majority opinion in Nassar spends a fair amount of time attempting to 
make sense of the legislative history and inconsistent statutory language 
as well as the Court’s own decisions concerning the anti-discrimination 
and anti-retaliation provisions of Title VII and the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA).226 While the majority’s reading of Title VII’s 
text to adopt a but-for standard of causation is certainly defensible, the 
textualist case for such an interpretation is hardly compelling.227 Perhaps 
aware of this fact, the majority devotes a portion of the opinion at the end 
to explaining why, from a policy standpoint, its interpretation is 
preferable. 
The majority’s fears over intruding too heavily upon employer 
discretion with respect to the workplace are almost palpable in this portion 
of the opinion.228 Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion points out “the ever-
increasing frequency” of retaliation claims and that “the number of 
retaliation claims filed with the EEOC has now outstripped those for every 
type of status-based discrimination except race.”229 The opinion then notes 
the potential burden that the rise in retaliation cases places on judicial 
resources.230 But beyond the burden on courts, there is a concern about the 
                                                     
224. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
225. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
226. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 at 2528–31 (majority opinion). 
227. See supra note 223 and accompanying text. 
228. See Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2547 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority “appears 
driven by a zeal to reduce the number of retaliation claims filed against employers”); Sandra F. 
Sperino & Suja A. Thomas, Fakers and Floodgates, 10 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 223, 224 (2014) (stating 
that the majority “used these concerns about fakers and floodgates to tip substantive discrimination 
law in an employer-friendly direction”). It is noteworthy that the actual number of civil rights lawsuits 
filed has declined over the same period while the number of retaliation charges filed with the EEOC 
has increased. Id. at 236–37. 
229. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2531 (majority opinion). 
230. See id. (noting concerns over “the fair and responsible allocation of resources in the judicial 
and litigation systems”). 
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burden on employers. Not only might adopting a less stringent causation 
standard lead to more retaliation claims, doing so might also lead to more 
frivolous claims, according to Justice Kennedy.231 
Indeed, the concern that a less stringent causation standard would spur 
more frivolous claims, thereby interfering with the ability of employers to 
run their own shops and impose litigation burdens on employers, seems 
to drive much of the opinion. In the majority’s view, a less strict causation 
standard will allow bad employees who fear disciplinary action to 
preemptively and falsely cry “discrimination” in an effort to set up a future 
retaliation claim if they are subsequently fired.232 The idea that bad 
employees often file frivolous claims of discrimination in order to deter 
employers from taking adverse action against them for fear of retaliation 
has long been an article of faith among many employers.233 That fear 
found voice in Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion: “an employee who 
knows that he or she is about to be fired for poor performance, given a 
lower pay grade, or even just transferred to a different assignment or 
location . . . might be tempted to make an unfounded charge of racial, 
sexual, or religious discrimination.”234 By engaging in what is at least 
potentially protected opposition conduct, the complaining employee 
might be able “to forestall [the employer’s] lawful action” by making an 
employer fear the possibility of a retaliation claim.235 If the employer goes 
ahead and makes a legitimate business decision about whether the 
                                                     
231. Id.; see also Shaninga v. St. Luke’s Med. Ctr. LP, No. CV-14-02475-PHX-GMS, 2016 WL 
1408289, at *11 (D. Ariz. Apr. 11, 2016) (quoting Nassar and stating “the stronger ‘but-for causation’ 
standard serves to close the door on employees seeking to file even more frivolous retaliation claims” 
(emphasis added)). 
232. See Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2532 (noting concerns over frivolous claims). 
233. Jonathan A. Segal, Supreme Court’s Messages on Retaliation, Arbitration, and 
Discrimination, in INSIDE THE MINDS: THE IMPACT OF SUPREME COURT EMPLOYMENT LAW CASES 
7, 11 (2010) (“[W]hile most employees who make complaints do so in good faith, there are times 
when an employee engages in a pre-emptive strike by alleging discrimination and harassment before 
an employment action is taken; and if an adverse action is taken at a later time, it may appear 
retaliatory.”); Robert J. Grossman, Diffusing Discrimination Claims, HR MAG. (May 1, 2009), 
https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/news/hr-magazine/pages/0509grossman.aspx [https://perma.cc/DF4 
8-XN59] (explaining that retaliation “claims can be engineered” by filing a discrimination claim and 
that by doing so, an employee is “painting himself with a coat of Teflon”); Paul Falcone, Avoid the 
Preemptive Strike, PAULFALCONEHR (Mar. 18, 2014), http://www.paulfalconehr.net/avoid-the-
preemptive-strike/ [https://perma.cc/AJE4-VY5G] (“[W]orkers are realizing more and more that it 
may be in their best interests to lodge a complaint with HR before you, their supervisor, have an 
opportunity to discipline or terminate them.”); Flander, supra note 62, at 20 (relating observation of 
defense lawyer that there is “more of a willingness among employees to use retaliation claims as 
covers for their poor job performance”). 
234. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2532. 
235. Id.  
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employee should keep her job, get paid the same, or be reassigned to a 
different job or location, the employee could turn around and sue for 
retaliation, knowing that a more favorable causation standard might make 
it more difficult for a court “to dismiss dubious claims at the summary 
judgment stage.”236 In short, concerns over the possibility that the threat 
of a retaliation claim might result in additional litigation costs and impact 
the discretion afforded to employers under the employment at-will 
doctrine mitigate in favor of a stringent causation standard. 
This portion of Nassar is one of the clearest expressions one can expect 
to find regarding the concerns that underlie some of the restrictive 
approaches federal courts have taken with respect to retaliation claims: 
there are too many trivial retaliation claims clogging up the docket and 
impacting the ability of employers to run their workplaces. Lower courts 
have raised similar concerns regarding retaliation claims. As one court 
suggested, employers may be “paralyzed into inaction once an employee 
has lodged a complaint under Title VII, making such a complaint 
tantamount to a ‘get out of jail free’ card for employees engaged in job 
misconduct.”237 
This theme is perhaps even more prevalent in retaliation cases in which 
the primary issue is whether an employee suffered a materially adverse 
action. Every day, an employer makes decisions or implements decisions 
concerning what the essential functions of a job are, who performs them, 
and when, where, and how they are performed. A retaliation claim 
involving the issue of whether an employer’s actions were materially 
adverse goes to the core of the discretion afforded to employers by the 
employment at-will rule. As explained by one court in the context of a 
retaliation decision, “[w]ork assignment claims strike at the very heart of 
an employer’s business judgment and expertise because they challenge an 
employer’s ability to allocate its assets in response to shifting and 
competing market priorities.”238 
This type of statement perhaps explains the strict approach some courts 
take on the issue of material adversity; the more broadly the concept of 
material adversity is defined, the greater the impact on an employer’s 
                                                     
236. Id. 
237. Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 928 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Drottz v. Park 
Electrochemical Corp., No. CV 11-1596-PHX-JAT, 2013 WL 6157858, at *15 (D. Ariz. Nov. 25, 
2013) (explaining that a less stringent causation standard “would transmute an employee’s preemptive 
engagement in a protected activity, whether frivolous or not, into a shield against the imminent 
consequences of poor job performance”). 
238. Davis v. Town of Lake Park, 245 F.3d 1232, 1244 (11th Cir. 2001). 
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decision-making authority concerning the minutiae of the workplace.239 
As a result, one frequently sees courts in these cases trotting out the almost 
boilerplate observation that anti-discrimination statutes do not authorize 
courts to act as a “super-personnel department,” second-guessing 
employers’ business decisions and intervening whenever employees feel 
they are being treated unjustly.240 This sentiment is usually conveyed in 
the process of concluding that the harms that an employee suffered were 
merely minor annoyances or inconveniences and that the law does not 
guarantee an employee a genial boss.241 
The Court’s decision in Crawford is also consistent with this idea. On 
its face, Crawford appears to be a case in which the Supreme Court could 
be expected to interpret Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision strictly in 
order to avoid judicial meddling in an employer’s internal affairs. Recall 
that Crawford involved retaliatory conduct on the part of an employer 
who was conducting an internal investigation into alleged sexual 
harassment.242 This seems like the sort of internal process lying deep 
within the shadow of employer discretion that the Court would seem 
hesitant to interfere with. Yet, the Court held that the employee’s act of 
providing “an ostensibly disapproving account of sexually obnoxious 
behavior toward her by a fellow employee” was protected activity under 
Title VII’s opposition clause.243 The Court’s decision seems considerably 
less intrusive upon employer discretion when one considers just how 
extreme the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals’ interpretation of the language 
in the opposition clause truly was. According to the Sixth Circuit, it was 
not enough that an employee merely oppose unlawful conduct; an 
                                                     
239. See Brake, supra note 61, at 155 (“The strictness of the reasonable belief doctrine may well 
mask an unarticulated concern in retaliation cases that the law not intrude too deeply into employer 
prerogatives to base employment decisions on discretionary reasons—for example, the employment 
at-will doctrine.”).  
240. Lisdahl v. Mayo Found., 633 F.3d 712, 722 (8th Cir. 2011); Barren v. Ne. Ill. Reg’l Commuter 
R.R. Corp., No. 13 CV 4390, 2016 WL 861183, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 7, 2016); Moat v. Aaron’s, Inc., 
No. 4:13-CV-181-VEH, 2014 WL 5860574, at *10 (N.D. Ala. Nov. 12, 2014); Levitant v. N.Y.C. 
Human Res. Admin., 914 F. Supp. 2d 281, 300 (E.D.N.Y. 2012); Webb v. Niagara County, No. 11-
CV-192S, 2012 WL 5499647, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2012); Beverly v. Kaupas, No. 05 C 6338, 
2008 WL 62404, at *14 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 29, 2008); Bozeman v. Per-Se Tech., Inc., 456 F. Supp. 2d 
1282, 1341 (N.D. Ga. 2006); Mowery v. Escambia Cty. Utils. Auth., No. 3:04CV382-RS-EMT, 2006 
WL 327965, at *20 (N.D. Fla. Feb. 10, 2006); see also Wolf v. MWH Constructors, Inc., 34 F. Supp. 
3d 1213, 1224, 1227 (M.D. Fla. 2014) (using the phrase in reference to employer’s actions that formed 
the basis for plaintiff’s discrimination claim and then concluding that the same actions were not 
materially adverse for purposes of plaintiff’s retaliation claim).  
241. Lisdahl, 633 F.3d at 722; Levitant, 914 F. Supp. 2d at 300. 
242. Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 555 U.S. 271 (2009); supra notes 17–19 and 
accompanying text. 
243. Crawford, 555 U.S. at 276. 
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employee must engage in “active, consistent ‘opposing’ activities” before 
conduct is protected.244 This rather extreme interpretation was 
inconsistent with ordinary understandings of the word “oppose.” 
Moreover, Crawford presented an extremely unusual situation that was 
unlikely to repeat itself often. When asked, as part of the investigation, 
whether harassment had occurred, the plaintiff answered in the affirmative 
and apparently did so in a way that conveyed her disapproval of the 
harassment. Ordinarily, it is not terribly difficult to decide whether an 
employee has opposed employer conduct. Crawford presents the one-in-
a-hundred case in which the employee’s actions are difficult to classify. 
But it seems obvious in hindsight that if Title VII’s anti-retaliation 
provision was going to serve any useful purpose in addressing 
discrimination, the Court had no choice but to declare that the plaintiff 
engaged in protected activity; it was simply a question of categorization. 
By declaring the plaintiff’s conduct to be protected under the opposition 
clause under these limited circumstances, the Court was hardly throwing 
open the floodgates of litigation. And by classifying the conduct as 
opposition conduct as opposed to participation conduct—thereby forcing 
future employees in this unusual situation to establish that they reasonably 
believed the conduct opposed was unlawful—the Court helped limit the 
potential impact of the decision on employer discretion. 
To be clear, this phenomenon is hardly unique to ADA and retaliation 
cases. Courts routinely bring out the “super-personnel department” 
language in discrimination cases of all stripes, most often when explaining 
why an employer has offered a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for 
its actions and why the plaintiff has failed to show that the asserted reason 
is a pretext for discrimination.245 And this is hardly the first article to posit 
that court decisions in the employment context may be influenced by fears 
concerning the floodgates of litigation and impinging upon the 
employment at-will rule. But these concerns are even more pronounced in 
retaliation and disability discrimination cases than in traditional 
discrimination cases. 
Much like the potential impact the ADA’s reasonable accommodation 
requirement has on employee discretion regarding virtually every aspect 
                                                     
244. Id. at 275 (quoting Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 211 F. App’x 373, 376 (6th Cir. 
2006)). 
245. See, e.g., Marcinuk v. Lew, No. 13-CV-12722, 2016 WL 111409, at *4 (D. Mass. Jan. 11, 
2016) (using “super personnel department” language and stating that to establish pretext, plaintiff 
“must offer evidence of such strength and quality . . . to permit a reasonable finding that [the adverse 
action] was obviously or manifestly unsupported” (alterations in original) (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted) (emphasis omitted)).  
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of the workplace,246 Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision addresses a range 
of employer actions not addressed by Title VII’s anti-discrimination 
provision. Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision covers more forms of 
employer action and decisions than its anti-discrimination provision.247 
The anti-discrimination provision prohibits only adverse employment 
actions, which are, by definition, limited to employer actions that concern 
employment.248 To qualify as an adverse employment action, the 
employer’s action must materially affect the compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment.249 In some circuits, the term is 
defined so narrowly that it only includes “ultimate employment 
decisions,” such as hiring, firing, promotion, and demotions.250 As the 
Supreme Court held in Burlington Northern, Title VII’s anti-retaliation 
provision covers a much wider array of retaliatory conduct. While the 
anti-retaliation provision does not address “petty slights or minor 
annoyances” in the workplace,251 it does address a range of discretionary, 
day-to-day managerial decisions that the employment at-will rule largely 
immunizes from judicial second-guessing. This potentially includes 
assignment of less desirable job duties;252 reassignment to a less desirable 
location or department;253 schedule changes;254 threatening a complaining 
employee with discipline, passing an employee over for training, and 
moving the employee to a less desirable office;255 preparing unfair 
performance evaluations;256 and formal reprimands.257 
                                                     
246. See supra notes 191–97 and accompanying text. 
247. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 67 (2006). 
248. See id. at 63 (explaining that Title VII’s anti-discrimination provision covers “employer 
actions and harm that concern employment and the workplace”). 
249. Davis v. Team Elec. Co., 520 F.3d 1080, 1089 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Jackman v. Fifth 
Judicial Dist. Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 728 F.3d 800, 804 (8th Cir. 2013) (“An adverse employment 
action is defined as a tangible change in working conditions that produces a material employment 
disadvantage, including but not limited to termination, cuts in pay or benefits, and changes that affect 
an employee’s future career prospects.”). 
250. Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997). 
251. Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 68. 
252. Id. at 70. 
253. Leslie v. Noble Drilling, LLC, No. H-16-0610, 2017 WL 1051131, at *9 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 17, 
2017). 
254. Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 69 (recognizing the potential for a schedule change to constitute a 
materially adverse action); Spalding v. City of Chicago, 186 F. Supp. 3d 884, 918 (N.D. Ill. 2016) 
(involving shift change as possible materially adverse action). 
255. Kretzman v. Erie County, No. 11-CV-0704, 2013 WL 636545, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 
2013); Loya v. Sebelius, 840 F. Supp. 2d 245, 252–53 (D.D.C. 2012). 
256. Walker v. Johnson, 798 F.3d 1085, 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
257. Millea v. Metro-N. R.R., 658 F.3d 154, 165 (2d Cir. 2011). 
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Given the potential impact on employer discretion and the concomitant 
burden on courts to review employers’ discretionary decisions, courts are 
seeking to limit the reach of retaliation law. With the ADA, courts 
developed a demanding approach to the definition of disability to prevent 
them from having to review an employer’s decision whether to grant a 
reasonable accommodation. In the retaliation context, courts have been 
able to develop a similar set of interpretive tools that often have the same 
effect. 
IV. PAST AS PROLOGUE: WHAT THE HISTORY OF 
DISABILITY LAW CAN TEACH US ABOUT THE FUTURE 
OF RETALIATION LAW 
The story arcs of modern disability law and retaliation law reveal an 
important lesson for employees: as a general rule, the greater the potential 
for a statute to intrude upon employer discretion regarding day-to-day 
decisions, the less likely a court is to interpret the statute in that manner. 
Stated differently, the deeper a statute potentially intrudes upon the 
discretion traditionally afforded to employers under the employment at-
will rule, the less receptive a court will be to interpretive arguments that 
would produce that result.258 
With this guiding principle in mind, the following Part briefly considers 
what can be done moving forward to better further the goals of anti-
retaliation provisions and protect employees from unlawful retaliation. 
And, once again, the history of the ADA proves instructive. 
A. The ADA Amendments Act: Congressional Response to the 
Disability Backlash 
In its original form, the ADA was a more detailed statute than Title 
VII.259 Unlike Title VII, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of 
traits that everyone possesses (race, sex, national origin, etc.), the ADA 
protected only a particular class of people: qualified individuals with 
disabilities.260 Thus, at least in this context, there was a more pressing 
need to define the relevant class. 
                                                     
258. See supra note 239 and accompanying text. 
259. See Judith L. Johnson, Rescue the Americans with Disabilities Act from Restrictive 
Interpretations: Alcoholism as an Illustration, 27 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 169, 182 (2007) (noting that 
while many of the ADA’s provisions were taken from Title VII, “the discrimination provisions of the 
ADA are much more specific”). 
260. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 2(b), 104 Stat. 327, 329 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (2012)). 
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The original language of the ADA employed “a thicket of interlocking 
definitions and requirements” to help define the concept of a “qualified 
individual with a disability.”261 However, several of these definitions 
provided limited guidance. Instead of defining the concept of “reasonable 
accommodation,” Congress instead simply included a relatively short list 
of illustrative accommodations.262 Congress placed an “undue hardship” 
limit on an employer’s reasonable accommodation obligation but included 
only the most general of definitions for that term.263 As discussed, the 
definition of “disability” was itself quite vague. For example, to meet this 
threshold, a plaintiff needed to establish the existence of an impairment 
that substantially limited a major life activity. However, the term “major 
life activity” was not defined in the Act.264 This led to numerous disputes 
over the meaning of the word “major”;265 whether certain activities (e.g., 
performing manual tasks) qualified as major life activities;266 and whether 
bodily functions, such as eliminating waste from one’s blood, could 
qualify as major life activities.267 
In this respect, the original version of the ADA and Title VII were fairly 
representative of older statutes in terms of their overall lack of specificity. 
After the enactment of the ADA, statutes have tended to become more 
detailed. As Professor Jarrod Shobe has observed, more modern statutes 
(which he defines as those drafted in the late 1990s and beyond) are more 
precise and detailed than their predecessors and are “replete with complex 
definitions and exceptions.”268 As a result, there is simply less room for 
judicial interpretation.269 
                                                     
261. Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasonable 
Accommodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1, 8 (1996). 
262. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 101(9), 104 Stat. at 331 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12111(9)). 
263. Id. § 101(10), 104 Stat. at 331 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)). 
264. Id. § 101, 104 Stat. at 330–31. 
265. See Toyota Motor Mfg., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002) (concluding that the phrase 
“major life activities” “refers to those activities that are of central importance to daily life”); Bragdon 
v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 659–60 (1998) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (questioning whether the word 
“major” in the definition indicates “comparative importance” or “greater in quantity, number, or 
extent”). 
266. See Toyota Motor Mfg., 534 U.S. at 196–97 (concluding that to fit within the definition, “the 
manual tasks in question must be central to daily life”). 
267. See Long, supra note 155, at 222–23 (discussing this issue). 
268. Shobe, supra note 204, at 813. 
269. Id. at 853. 
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The ADAAA is representative of these types of more modern 
statutes.270 The original version of the ADA included a Findings and 
Purposes section that described the types of discrimination individuals 
with disabilities had faced and the need for action.271 But when Congress 
amended the ADA, it added detailed findings and purposes that describe 
Congress’s objections to the courts’ interpretation of the original Act.272 
For example, over the course of several paragraphs, the Findings and 
Purposes section of the ADAAA explicitly rejects the reasoning and legal 
standards that emerged from Supreme Court decisions and explains in 
greater details the underlying purposes of the Act.273 Courts now routinely 
cite to this language as they consider ADA claims that would once have 
probably floundered on the question of whether a plaintiff had a 
disability.274 The ADAAA also added considerable detail to the definition 
of disability, including rules of construction regarding some of the more 
problematic and controversial definitional issues that had arisen.275 In 
addition, the amendments add a fairly substantial illustrative list of major 
life activities and clarify that the term “major life activity” covers major 
bodily functions.276 
As a result of these changes, ADA plaintiffs have enjoyed much greater 
success on the threshold question of whether a disability exists.277 The 
ADAAA has significantly limited the need for judicial interpretation of 
the terms in the definition of disability and it has made application of those 
                                                     
270. See Barry, supra note 173, at 20 (explaining that the guiding principle of the ADAAA “was 
to leave nothing important to legislative history—get it all in the text, and use legislative history as a 
safety net and a blueprint for agencies to follow in promulgating regulations”). Professor Barry 
explains, “[t]he ADA is a micromanager statute; courts should not be botching the disability analysis 
by failing to consider rules of construction clearly enumerated in the statute’s text.” Id. at 33. 
271. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 2, 104 Stat. 327, 328–29. 
272. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2, 122 Stat. 3553, 3553–34 (codified 
at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012)). 
273. Id.  
274. See, e.g., Ramdeen v. Trihop 69th St., LLC, No. 16-1361, 2017 WL 930431, at *3 (E.D. Pa. 
Mar. 9, 2017) (explaining why pre-ADAAA decision calling for strict interpretation of terms within 
the definition of disability was no longer relevant); Gard v. Dooley, No. 4:41-CV-04023-LLP, 2017 
WL 782279, at *5 (D.S.D. Feb. 28, 2017) (explaining that pre-ADAAA caselaw required that 
mitigating measures be taken into account when determining whether an impairment substantially 
limits a major life activity). 
275. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 4, 122 Stat. 3553, 3555–57 (amending 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12102). For example, the ADAAA contains a section explaining how courts should approach the 
question of whether to take into account the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures such as 
medication or devices when assessing whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life 
activity. Id. 
276. Id.  
277. See supra note 160 and accompanying text. 
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terms much simpler. In contrast, Congress chose not to provide greater 
clarity to the concepts of reasonable accommodation, essential functions, 
and undue burden.278 As a result, courts are left to deal with difficult 
interpretive issues that directly implicate employer discretion in 
meaningful ways. Not surprisingly, ADA plaintiffs continue to face 
significant difficulty on these issues even after the passage of the 
ADAAA.279 
B. Retaliation 
The history of the ADA provides a model for those interested in 
protecting employees from retaliation. Creative interpretive arguments 
and calls for courts to pay attention to the underlying purposes of the 
statutory language failed miserably in the case of the ADA and are 
increasingly failing in the case anti-retaliation provisions. In light of the 
tendency of courts to interpret and apply the language of anti-retaliation 
provisions in ways that preserve employer discretion with respect to the 
minutiae of the workplace, anti-retaliation advocates need to seek a 
legislative fix. The ADA Amendments Act provides a useful example, 
both positive and negative. 
The ADAAA serves as a positive example in terms of the greater clarity 
and guidance it provides to courts. Congress could do something similar 
with respect to retaliation law. First, Congress could include an updated 
findings and purposes section that makes explicit that one of the primary 
purposes of anti-retaliation provisions is to prevent employer interference 
with unfettered access to a statute’s remedial mechanisms.280 The section 
could also briefly summarize some of the realities associated with 
workplace retaliation, such as the reluctance many employees have to 
report concerns over unlawful discrimination, how strongly fears over 
retaliation tend to dissuade such reporting, and the financial and emotional 
impact some employees have faced after having been retaliated against. 
Finally, like the ADAAA, this new section could identify specific 
congressional objections to previous federal decisions, such as holding 
employees to an unrealistic standard in terms of the reasonableness of 
their beliefs regarding whether employer conduct was unlawful.281 
In addition, the amendments could add clarity to each portion of the 
plaintiff’s prima facie case. In defining protected conduct under the 
                                                     
278. See Long, supra note 155 and accompanying text. 
279. See supra notes 164–72 and accompanying text.  
280. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006). 
281. See supra note 273 and accompanying text. 
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opposition clause, the amendments could incorporate Breeden’s 
reasonable belief but clarify, as the ADAAA did with respect to the 
definition of disability,282 that this standard should be construed in favor 
of broad coverage. The amendments could incorporate the likely-to-
dissuade-a-reasonable-employee standard from Burlington Northern in 
defining what types of retaliation are actionable. And much in the same 
way the ADAAA clarified the “major life activities” concept, the 
amendments could also provide an illustrative list of employer actions that 
might well dissuade a reasonable employee from opposing unlawful 
conduct and that courts sometimes rule as a matter of law do not rise to 
this level, including threatened termination or negative evaluations.283 
Finally, much in the same way the ADAAA expressly rejected some of 
the Supreme Court’s specific holdings regarding the ADA’s definition of 
disability,284 the amendments could explicitly reject the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Nassar regarding the but-for causation standard and adopt 
something more akin to a motivating factor standard.285 
The ADAAA also provides an example of the dangers of a piecemeal 
approach to statutory amendment. Ideally, Congress would undertake a 
comprehensive reform of all of discrimination law, including retaliation 
law.286 Failing that, Congress would enact a measure adopting a uniform 
retaliation standard for all federal workplace statutes to replace the current 
piecemeal approach, which often results in different language and 
different standards for seemingly no good reason.287 Failing that, 
Congress could at least amend the dominant statutes in the field—Title 
VII, the ADA, and the ADEA—to include the suggested revisions. 
But unless the political realities mandate doing so, Congress should 
avoid the piecemeal approach it took with respect to the ADAAA. The 
amendments took aim at specific federal court decisions regarding the 
definition of disability but left untouched the portions of the statute 
covering reasonable accommodations. Not surprisingly, courts have 
interpreted those portions in a manner that limits their reach.288 It would 
perhaps be tempting for Congress to simply overrule Nassar, the most 
                                                     
282. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 4(a), 122 Stat. 3553, 3555 
(amending 42 U.S.C. § 12102). 
283. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
284. See supra note 273 and accompanying text. 
285. Nassar v. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr., 674 F.3d 448, 454 (5th Cir. 2012) (recognizing this 
standard), rev’d, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013). 
286. William R. Corbett, Calling on Congress: Take a Page from Parliament’s Playbook and Fix 
Employment Discrimination Law, 66 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 135, 136 (2013) (calling on Congress 
to undertake a comprehensive reform of employment discrimination law).  
287. See Long, supra note 48, at 569–76 (calling for such a standard). 
288. See supra notes 164–72 and accompanying text. 
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recent and high profile judicial limitation on the reach of anti-retaliation 
law. But this sort of tinkering around the edges fails to account for the 
likelihood that if courts are required to apply a more lenient causation 
standard, they are likely to continue to interpret and apply the rest of the 
statute in a manner that limits its impact on employer discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
The judicial fears associated with serving in the role of “super-
personnel department” are especially strong in the case of retaliation 
cases. While acts of employer retaliation sometimes trigger an almost 
intuitive sense of injustice, the concerns over second-guessing the types 
of managerial decisions that make up the average workday have greatly 
influenced judicial decisions in the retaliation area. These same concerns 
originally prompted a judicial backlash that thwarted the reach of the 
ADA to the point that legislative reform was the only solution. Anti-
retaliation law is gradually heading in this same direction. Given the 
similarities in terms of the development of the law, employee rights 
advocates should take a page from the history of disability law and seek 
broad legislative reform. 
